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Abstract Existing work on automated negotiations has mainly focused on bilateral
negotiations with linear utility functions. It is often assumed that all possible agree-
ments and their utility values are given beforehand. Most real-world negotiations
however are much more complex. We introduce a new family of negotiation algo-
rithms that is applicable to domains with many agents, an intractably large space of
possible agreements, non-linear utility functions and limited time so an exhaustive
search for the best proposals is not feasible. We assume that agents are selfish and
cannot be blindly trusted, so the algorithm does not rely on any mediator. This
family of algorithms is called NB3 and applies heuristic Branch & Bound search to
find good proposals. Search and negotiation happen simultaneously and therefore
strongly influence each other. It applies a new time-based negotiation strategy that
considers two utility aspiration levels: one for the agent itself and one for its oppo-
nents. Also, we introduce a negotiation protocol that imposes almost no restrictions
and is therefore better applicable to negotiations with humans. We present the Ne-
gotiating Salesmen Problem (NSP): a variant of the Traveling Salesman Problem
with multiple negotiating agents, as a test case. We describe an implementation of
NB3 designed for the NSP and present the results of experiments with this imple-
mentation. We conclude that the algorithm is able to decrease the costs of the agents
significantly, that the heuristic search is efficient and that the algorithm scales well
with increasing complexity of the problem.
Keywords Multilateral · Negotiation · Search · Non-linear Utility · Negotiating
Salesmen Problem
1 Introduction
In multiagent systems (MAS) the outcome of the actions of an agent usually depends
on the actions of other agents. These agents may have conflicting goals, and, since
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the other agents may be unknown and may not be benevolent, an agent generally
cannot assume that other agents are willing to help without getting anything in
return. If each agent would simply take those actions that are individually best, the
result will often be sub-optimal for each of them, like in the well known prisoner’s
dilemma [38]. Therefore, agents in a MAS need to negotiate on what actions each
will take. This is exactly what the field of automated negotiations deals with. If a
Nash equilibrium [32] is not Pareto optimal, then negotiations allow the agents to
reach a more efficient solution, with the commitment from each agent not to deviate
from it.
In automated negotiations it is assumed that there exists a set of agreements that
the agents can make with each other. We call this set the agreement space. Agents can
propose agreements from this space to each other and can accept or reject proposals
made by others. If a proposal is accepted, it means that each agent involved in the
deal has committed itself to execute a certain set of actions. The execution of these
actions then yields a certain amount of utility for each agent involved. Although each
agent is only interested in optimizing its own utility, it may require the cooperation
of the other agents to obtain this and therefore needs to make sure the other agents
also receive enough utility to ensure their cooperation. We stress the fact however,
that a good negotiation algorithm tries to exploit its opponents as much as possible
and has no interest in reaching a social optimum.
1.1 Relation to other Fields
Maximizing a utility function for a set of independent agents is also the goal of Dis-
tributed Constraint Optimization Problems (DCOP), but these problems are funda-
mentally different from negotiation problems, because DCOPs assume there is only
one global function to be optimized and the agents cooperate with the joint goal
of finding the solution that maximizes this global utility function [30]. Therefore,
DCOP algorithms cannot be applied in cases where each agent is selfish and has its
own utility function.
A field closely related to automated negotiations is the field of cooperative game
theory [36]. In cooperative game theory one assumes that utility is assigned to coali-
tions of agents and that agents within such a coalition can freely divide the utility
between one another. Such a division of utility is called an ‘allocation’ and the set
of allocations that keeps the coalition stable is called the ‘core’. The notion of an
allocation in cooperative game theory can be compared to the notion of a deal in
automated negotiations, and the notion of a coalition can be compared to a set
of agents that together agree on a certain deal. The difference however is that co-
operative game theory is mainly concerned with the question of whether the core
and other solution concepts exist, while automated negotiations focus more on how
agents decide to agree on a certain allocation.
Alternatively, negotiations can be modeled as a non-cooperative game, by mod-
eling the proposals and acceptances of deals as the moves of a game. This is for
example the approach taken in [32], [23] [1] and [2]. One can then try to apply
techniques from non-cooperative game theory to find equilibrium strategies. We will
however not do this, but take a heuristic approach instead.
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1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper we introduce a new family of negotiation algorithms, called NB3
(Negotiation-Based Branch & Bound), that applies a heuristic Branch & Bound
search to explore the agreement space and determine which of the possible proposals
are good enough to propose or accept. Our main motivation for this is that many
existing papers make strong assumptions about the environment that we consider
unrealistic in real-world negotiations.
Previously proposed negotiation algorithms have mainly focused on the utility
values of deals, rather than the underlying deals themselves [31] [12], [13]. They
assume that for a given proposal the utility for the agents is directly given, or can be
calculated quickly. They describe a strategy to propose a deal characterized by a pair
of utility values (u1, u2) at time t, but the deal itself is abstracted away and reduced
to nothing more than this pair of utility values. They do not take into account that
in reality, when you are negotiating about say, a car, for every offer made to you by
the salesman, you first have to evaluate how much that deal is worth to you before
you can make a decision.
The negotiation algorithm introduced in this paper negotiates explicitly over
deals rather than over utility values. This is important for three reasons. Firstly,
the evaluation of a deal may be computationally expensive, and therefore cannot be
ignored in real-world situations. Secondly, if an opponent applies a different algorithm
he may have different approximations of the utility values than you, so proposing a
pair of utility values without specifying the underlying deal has no meaning. Thirdly,
it is important not to reveal your valuation of a deal, as this is important strategic
information.
Moreover, many papers assume that for any given utility value it is possible to
find a proposal that exactly yields that value [24] (they assume the utility functions
map surjectively onto an interval of the real numbers). This is often not the case,
for example when the agreement space is discrete [44], when there are integrity
constraints among the issues [48], or when there is no closed-form expression of the
utility function [11].
While game theoretical approaches of negotiations often assume full knowledge,
or partial knowledge about utility functions [2], [15], most heuristic approaches as-
sume that the utility values for the opponents of the agent are completely unknown
[6]. Although it is true that one generally does not know the precise utilities for your
opponents, we think that in a real-world negotiation you would at least know the
preference order of your opponents, and you would have an approximate idea of your
opponent’s utility. Suppose for example that you are negotiating the price of a car.
As a client you do not know precisely what would be the lowest price the dealer is
willing to accept, but at least you know that the price of the car should, for example,
be in the range of 10,000 to 20,000 Euro. Offering any price below this range would
probably make negotiations fail, while offering a price above this range would be a
very costly mistake. Also, you know that the aim of the car dealer is to make you
pay a price as high as possible.
In this paper we model the fact that agents have approximate knowledge about
their opponents’ utilities by assuming that the expressions of the utility functions
of the agents are publicly known, but evaluating these expressions to obtain utility
values is costly in terms of time. Therefore, our agent can only make approximations
of the opponents’ utility values, and can only do so for a limited set of possible deals.
4 Dave de Jonge, Carles Sierra
While most of the previous studies on automated negotiation assume strict nego-
tiation protocols such as the Alternating Offers Protocol [40] to structure the actions
of the agents, we assume an unstructured protocol that imposes almost no restric-
tions; the agents are allowed to say whatever they want and whenever they want, and
are never required to reply to any proposal. This high degree of freedom introduces
another dimension of complexity to the scenario, but makes it closer to real-world
negotiations and can therefore be applied, for example, in negotiations with humans.
In order to deal with this unstructured protocol we have developed a new ne-
gotiation strategy that not only determines what proposal to make next, but also
takes time into account to determine whether the agent should really make a new
proposal or rather continue searching for better proposals. This distinguishes our
strategy from existing negotiation strategies.
Finally, in order to test our algorithm, we have defined a new negotiation game,
which is a variant of the traveling salesman problem in which there are several
salesmen that have to negotiate in order to minimize their individual path lengths.
The complexity of the traveling salesman problem makes it a non-trivial task to
calculate the utility of a given proposal, or to find a proposal with a given utility
value, so traditional negotiation algorithms cannot be applied.
In short, we take the following assumptions into account:
– Utility is highly non-linear and calculating it or inverting it is computationally
expensive.
– Solutions may involve a large number of agents, possibly including humans.
– The space of solutions is very large, i.e. there is no possibility to exhaustively
explore the set of solutions.
– The environment changes during the negotiations due to actions of others.
– Other agents in the system are unknown.
– Decisions have to be made within a limited time frame.
Although many of these assumptions have been made before in existing work, to the
best of our knowledge no algorithm exists that takes all of these into account.
Many difficult problems indeed require these assumptions to be made, e.g:
Online Shopping: when searching online for the best deal it would be convenient
to have an automated agent that could negotiate on your behalf with the sellers.
Especially if the product is composed of several smaller products such as a fully
integrated holiday package this can get complex. In this case utility is difficult to
calculate as your agent would need estimate for each deal under consideration how
much you would valuate it. Furthermore, your agent should consider multiple sellers
to buy from, the number of possible combinations of products can easily become very
large, the environment changes since prices may change, new products may enter the
market, or may sell out, the sellers may be anonymous and you may need to have
the products before a certain deadline.
Time Tabling: School teachers have individual preferences for their teaching sched-
ules. Once an initial schedule is determined by the school head, they may im-
prove their particular allocations by negotiating local exchanges with fellow teachers.
Teachers may for example want to avoid ‘holes’ in their schedules, or may want their
schedules to be compatible with other activities (e.g. to practice sports). Current
software solutions [46], [45] are centralized and do not permit negotiation among
teachers. Again, utility is difficult to calculate because a teacher’s agent needs to
estimate how much the teacher would valuate a certain schedule. Schedules may
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involve many teachers, the number of possible schedules that can be constructed is
large, the set of feasible schedules changes as other teachers may come to agreements
before you, making your preferred schedule impossible, and the final schedule has to
be constructed before the start of the year.
Logistics: A key issue in logistics is how to optimize multi-truck scheduling of pack-
age delivery between companies where every connection between nodes in the deliv-
ery network has a cost and every package delivery has a price. Current centralized
systems [29] are not reactive enough to dynamic changes and call for a more effi-
cient distributed solution where the negotiation of who transports what is done at
the truck’s and customer’s level. A simplified version of this problem with postmen
exchanging letters was studied in [40]. In this case utility is a complicated function
that depends on distances to cover, amount of time and fuel necessary for the de-
livery and the price payed by the customer. Many package deliverers may be on the
road simultaneously, many packages may need to be delivered in a day, along many
possible routes, the environment changes as new packages appear throughout the
day and traffic jams may occur, deliverers may be from different companies and may
therefore be unknown, and clients expect their packages to be delivered on time.
Diplomacy: Diplomacy is a classical board game for seven players, without chance
moves. This game is designed such that players need to form coalitions and therefore
need to negotiate with their opponents in order to play well. An online community
dedicated to the application of AI to Diplomacy has been developing software bots
for many years [8], but most of those bots do not apply any reasonable negotiation
techniques and are thus vulnerable when playing with humans that show great ca-
pacity in negotiation [34], [26]. In this case, utility is defined by your probabilities
to win the game, for which no explicit formula exists (like in chess). Deals are often
made between 3 or 4 players. The agreement space of this game is very large: there
are 34 units on the board, each of which has around 5 to 10 options for each turn,
while a game typically takes more than 20 turns to finish. The environment changes
in each turn of the game, the game is often played online with unknown players, and
each turn of the game has a fixed time limit.
The NB3 algorithm that we present in this paper is capable of doing negotiations
under realistic scenarios that satisfy the strong criteria mentioned above. Since it is
not feasible to calculate the utility values of each possible deal it applies a heuristic
search algorithm to determine which possible deals should be evaluated.
This paper is organized as follows: first, in Section 2 we give a brief overview
of existing work in the field of automated negotiations. In Section 3 we state the
assumptions made in this paper and define our goals. In Section 4 we give a formal
definition of the negotiation problems we aim to solve and in Section 5 we define
the protocol that we apply to the negotiations. Next, in Section 6 we define the
Negotiating Salesmen Problem: a specific example of a negotiation problem as defined
earlier, which we use for the experiments. Then, in Section 7 we introduce our family
of negotiation algorithms called NB3 and in Section 8 we describe the negotiation
strategy applied by NB3. Next, in Section 9 we describe an implementation of an
agent that uses the NB3 negotiation algorithm to negotiate in the specific scenario of
the Negotiating Salesmen Problem. In section 10 we describe the experimental results
we obtained with this agent. Finally, in Section 11 we summarize our conclusions
and discuss future work.
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2 Related Work
Much work has been done on automated negotiations, which can roughly be divided
in two categories: the Game Theoretical Approach and the Heuristic Approach.
The game theoretical approach focuses on the game theoretical properties of
negotiation, such as the existence of equilibrium strategies. One of the best known
papers in this area is a paper by Nash [31] in which it is shown that under the
assumption of certain axioms the outcome of a bilateral negotiation is the solution
that maximizes the product of the players’ utilities. Many papers have been written
afterwards that generalize or adapt some of these assumptions. Multilateral versions
of the bargaining problem have been studied for example in [23] and [1], while a
non-linear generalization has been made in [14]. A general overview of such game
theoretical studies is made in [42].
This paper falls into the second category, the Heuristic Approach: work that
focuses on implementing algorithms that can negotiate under circumstances where
no equilibrium results are known, or where the equilibrium cannot be determined in
a reasonable amount of time.
Most studies that have been done in this category however involve scenarios
with only two agents, a small agreement space and linear additive utility functions
that are explicitly given or can be calculated without much computational cost.
For example in the first four editions of the annually held Automated Negotiating
Agent Competition (ANAC 2010-2013) [6]. Also, most of these studies assume an
alternating offers protocol, which is good for automated agents, but not desirable
for negotiations with humans, because with humans there is no guarantee that they
will indeed follow the protocol.
The combination of search and negotiation has been studied before, for example
in [13]. There, the agent has a fixed aspiration level for its utility and searches for the
deal that satisfies this aspiration level and is closest (with respect to some similarity
measure) to the deal previously proposed by the opponent. This assumes however
that there are only two agents involved in the negotiation. Also, their algorithm does
not try to model the opponent’s preferences and therefore only considers contracts
that are close to contracts previously proposed by the opponent. Moreover, in order
to find the next best contract to propose, it assumes that the utility function is
linearly additive.
Klein et al. also propose a negotiation scenario with search in [21], but time
constraints are not taken into account. A more important difference between their
approach and ours is that their algorithm applies a mediator that must be trusted
and that limits the control that the agents have over the search, since they can only
accept or reject proposals made by the mediator, while this mediator does all the
searching. In our work we are assuming circumstances where other agents cannot be
trusted, so the use of a mediator is not an option. In the same article they also propose
a variant of their algorithm without a mediator, involving a mutually observable ‘die’
to steer the search, instead. But this still means that the agents should trust the fact
that the die is fair. Moreover, the agents need to follow a strict protocol, so this
algorithm is only suitable for negotiation between agents that were designed for this
particular protocol. In [10] it was suggested that one could use genetic algorithms
to explore the agreement space. However, neither an implementation nor concrete
results were given.
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Negotiations with non-linear utility functions have been studied for example in
[24]. The negotiations are however bilateral, the agreement space is continuous and
it is assumed the agreements at least have a known, closed-form, expression. Also in
[21] the utility functions are strictly spoken non-linear over the issues, but they are
still linearly additive over pairs of issues.
Other research on large agreement spaces with non-linear utility has been done
in [27] and [19], [28]. In these cases the non-linearity stems from the fact that some
combinations of constraints are incompatible and therefore result in zero utility.
Whenever two or more constraints are compatible however, they do assume that
the utility is a linearly additive over these constraints, so they treat the problem as
a linear additive optimization problem restricted by some constraints. Although in
theory any non-linear function can indeed be modeled in this way, in practice it is
often not feasible to do so because one needs an explicit expression of the utility
function, which one often does not have (e.g. there is no closed-form expression
for the utility values of all possible configurations of a chess game). Moreover, the
algorithms described in [19] and [28] again depend largely on a mediator.
This model of non-linear utility functions given as linear combinations of con-
straints was also adopted in the last edition of the Automated Negotiating Agents
Competition (ANAC 2014). We have participated in this competition, but we did
not use the NB3 algorithm, because negotiations were bilateral and the agents in this
competition had very little information about their own utility functions. In order
to know the value of any bid they had to request it from an oracle.
Work that comes relatively close to ours is [39], in which non-linear utilities
are handled using preference-graphs. They focus however on how to simplify the
utility by exploiting knowledge about independence between issues. They assume
that utility can indeed be simplified in such a way that the search space is shrunk
to a reasonable size and can be explored exhaustively. Moreover, they only consider
bilateral negotiations.
Most research on multilateral negotiations that we know of (apart from the game
theoretical papers mentioned above) focuses on developing protocols ([9] and [17]) or
on non-selfish negotiations [22]. We do not know of many papers in which multilateral
negotiation algorithms for selfish agents are developed, like in this paper.
One case in which such an algorithm was proposed, is [33]. In their study however,
a strict separation is made between buyers and sellers, so a buyer can only come
to an agreement with a seller. Our approach is more general, since we do not make
this distinction. Indeed, in many real life negotiations one often does not make this
distinction either. A retailer, for example, sells its products to consumers, but buys
them from a wholesaler, so acts both as buyer and seller. Moreover, they consider the
presence of only one buyer, therefore excluding competition between possible buyers,
and although multiple sellers are present, they still assume that each agreement
is strictly bilateral. Once again utility is linear additive and the alternating offers
protocol is assumed.
Also [3] describes multilateral negotiations in which one buyer negotiates with
n sellers, but each negotiation thread between the buyer and a seller follows the
alternating offers protocol, and they negotiate only about the price of a single item.
As explained, our algorithm applies a Branch & Bound (BB) search algorithm to
explore the space of possible agreements. BB has mostly been used as a centralized
algorithm. Distributed versions that try and exploit concurrency in the exploration of
the tree do also exist [16]. However, not much work has been done on the application
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of BB algorithms in search problems where the variables are controlled by different
agents, as in the asynchronous backtracking method used in Distributed Constraint
Satisfaction [48], and where there is not one single function f (x) to optimize but a
set of functions, one per agent, that are not centrally known.
3 Problem Statement
In this section we define the goal of our work, state the assumptions we have made,
and motivate the approach we have taken. A formal definition of the problem we
aim to tackle is given in Sections 4 and 5.
3.1 Assumptions
The goal of the research presented in this paper is to design an agent that is able to
decrease its cost function, and to do so better than other agents. We have made the
following assumptions:
– Negotiations are multilateral.
– Every agent has a finite set of actions it can take to change the current world
state (see Section 4).
– Each agent has an individual preference relation over world states, defined by a
cost function (see Section 4).
– Agents are selfish: each agent wants to take those actions that decrease its own
cost. The agents have no interest in minimizing other agents’ cost functions or
reaching a social optimum.
– The definitions of the cost functions are publicly known.
– The cost functions do not have an explicit formula, but are expressed as an NP-
hard problem and therefore calculating the cost of a world state or proposal is
computationally expensive (see Section 6).
– Agents can make binding agreements with each other about the actions each will
take. This can improve the efficiency of their actions.
– The number of possible agreements is too large to apply exhaustive search (in
Section 6.5 we show there can be as many as 20200 possible agreements in our
experiments).
– The agents negotiate about their plans of action under the Unstructured Com-
munication Protocol (see Section 5).
– There is a fixed deadline for the negotiations which is equal for all agents and
known to all agents.
– The cost functions do not change over time (e.g. there are no discount factors).
– There is no mediator to help the negotiations.
Furthermore, we have made the following assumptions in this paper, purely to keep
the discussion and the notation simple. Our algorithm would work equally well with-
out these assumptions.
– For any agent i a joint plan in which i does not participate does not influence
the cost of i.
– The order of execution of actions is irrelevant for the outcome of those actions.
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Finally, we mention some important properties we do not take into account, although
we think a realistic algorithm should take them into account. We leave them for future
work.
– Non-numerical preferences: when negotiating with real people it is often not
possible to express preferences as numerical values. Therefore, it would should
be better to use preference relations, rather than real-valued cost functions.
– Modeling opponent cost functions: in this paper we assume that an explicit ex-
pression for the opponents’ cost functions is given. In real-world scenarios one
may need to make a model of the opponents’ costs.
– Modeling opponent strategy: we do not make any attempt to model the conces-
sion strategy of the opponent. Our agent just uses a generic, fixed strategy that
does not adapt to the opponents’ strategies.
– In this paper we assume agents always fulfill their commitments. In a real nego-
tiation setting there should be some system that enforces agents to fulfill their
commitments, otherwise making a commitment has no real meaning. We don’t
use such a system. Instead we have simply implemented all agents such that they
do fulfill their commitments.
3.2 Complete Information
Although formally speaking the agents in this model have complete information in
the sense that the cost functions are publicly known, we feel it is important to stress
that in practice the information they have is far from complete. This is because the
agents only know the definitions of the cost functions. In order to know the values of
the cost functions however, they need to perform heavy, time consuming calculations.
Given that the domains under consideration are very large, it is absolutely impossible
for any agent to know all the cost values of all possible deals for all agents. Therefore,
an agent will usually only make approximations of the cost values and can only do
so for a very small subset of the agreement space.
3.3 Approach
The approach that we take is purely heuristic. We do not try to find any equilibrium
strategies because we do not think calculating an equilibrium strategy in the real
world is a feasible thing to do. Also, even in the scenario we treat in this paper we
cannot think of any way to find formal game theoretical results without simplifying
our assumptions so much that they become unrealistic in real-world applications.
Let us state some arguments to support this:
– We do not make common assumptions such as the existence of a discount factor,
which are often needed to obtain non-trivial results, because we don’t think in
real negotiations you would ever explicitly have such a discount factor (or know
its value).
– Any result that provides hard mathematical guarantees would probably only refer
to the test case under consideration (the NSP, see Section 6), while our goal is
to tackle negotiation problems in general.
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– The number of possible deals the agents can make is very large: typically of the
order 10100 in our experiments, and there are no clear symmetries to reduce this
considerably. Analyzing all possible options of a player is impossible.
– Since the players cannot calculate the utilities of all 10100 deals, they need to
apply a heuristic exploration of the space of possible deals to determine which
ones to calculate. This exploration takes place continuously, meaning that the
knowledge the agents have about the world changes continuously, and since many
solution concepts depend on the knowledge of the agents, such results would also
change continuously.
– Even if you find an optimal strategy that tells you to propose a deal with a given
target utility, there is no guarantee that you can actually find a deal that indeed
yields that utility.
– Since each player explores the space of possible deals independently, each player
discovers different possible deals. Therefore, a player does not know which pro-
posals the other players have discovered so far, so there is lack of information
about the opponents’ options.
– Players do not only accept or propose deals, but also need to decide how long to
search for good deals before making a proposal. How would one assign utility to
such a decision? Of course one could define some kind of utility function for that,
but the results would be dependent on that choice, therefore lose all generality,
and therefore not satisfy our goals.
A good example that exemplifies these statements is the game of Diplomacy [11],
[8], [34]. This game has been played by many players worldwide for more than 50
years. If people would have been able to find an optimal negotiation strategy for this
game, it would not have been interesting to play it anymore.
4 The Agreement Space
In this section we give a formal definition of what we call a (multilateral) negotiation
problem. The definitions and notation presented here will be used throughout the
paper. These definitions hold for agents that aim to minimize their cost functions,
but they could be changed straightforwardly to deal with maximization of utility
functions instead.
Definition 1 A negotiation problem is a tuple 〈A, Oˆ, fˆ , E , 0, tdead〉 where A is a
set of agents A = {α, β, . . . }, where Oˆ is a tuple of sets of actions, one for each
agent: Oˆ = (Oα,Oβ , . . . ), where fˆ is a tuple of cost functions, one for each agent:
fˆ = (fα, fβ , . . . ), where E is a set of world states, 0 ∈ E the initial world state, and
tdead ∈ R+ the deadline for the negotiations. These concepts are further explained
below.
A negotiation problem consists of a number of agents1 A = {α, β, . . . } situated in
a world state 0, which is an element of the set of all possible world states E . Each
agent i ∈ A has a set of actions Oi to its disposal, and each of these actions can
be executed, causing the state of the world to change. So each action ac is in fact a
1 In this paper we use Greek letters to indicate specific elements of the set A (i.e. they are
the names of the agents), while we use Latin letters as variables over the set A. The letter 
however is used to refer to world states, so it is not the name of any agent.
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function ac : E → E , ac() = ′, where  is the current world state and ′ is a new
world state. The union of all actions of all agents is denoted as O = ⋃i∈AOi .
Definition 2 A plan p is a set of actions: p ⊆ O.
A plan p acts on a world state  by letting all the actions ac ∈ p act on  (to keep the
notation and the discussion simple we assume that the order in which the actions
are executed is irrelevant, although this restriction is not necessary for the algorithm
to work).
Definition 3 The Agreement Space is the set of all possible plans: 2O.
Each agent i has a cost function fi : E → R that induces a preference relation over
E . An agent i prefers world state 1 over 2 iff fi(1) < fi(2).
Some plans may be unfeasible in a certain world state (e.g. you cannot sell a
car if you don’t own a car). Formally, we do say that such a plan can be executed,
but the execution of an unfeasible plan leaves the world state invariant. The set of
feasible plans in world state  is denoted as fea().
Definition 4 The set of feasible plans in world state  is the set of plans for which
 is not a fixed point: fea() = {p ∈ 2O | p() 6= }. An action ac is feasible in  if
and only if the plan {ac} is feasible in .
Definition 5 The set of participating agents pa(p) of a plan p is the set of all agents
that have at least one action in the plan: pa(p) = {i ∈ A | p ∩Oi 6= ∅}.
In the rest of this paper we will make the simplifying assumption that for any agent
i a plan in which i does not participate does not have any influence on the cost of i.
That is:
i 6∈ pa(p)⇒ ∀  ∈ E : fi(p()) = fi()
This assumption is not necessary for the NB3 algorithm to work, but it highly sim-
plifies the discussion and definitions in this paper.
Definition 6 The reservation value rvi for an agent i is the cost it incurs if it does
not participate in any plan: rvi = fi(0).
The reservation value of an agent represents the maximum cost that that agent
would be willing to incur from accepting any plan. In other words: no agent would
ever accept any plan for which the cost is higher than the agent’s reservation value.
After all, if a proposed plan yields a higher cost than the reservation value, the agent
would prefer not to participate in any plan at all.
5 The Unstructured Communication Protocol
We will now define the protocol that is used by the agents to negotiate. That is: we
define the utterances agents can express, when they can express them, and what their
formal consequences are. This protocol is entirely new and is called the Unstructured
Communication Protocol.
Most previous studies have made use of the Alternating-Offers Protocol [40], or
something alike. They assume that one agent makes a proposal to another agent, and
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then this other agent is obliged to either accept the proposal or reject it. If the agent
rejects it, it is then its turn to make a proposal, etcetera. Alternative protocols are
proposed for example in [3]: it describes multilateral negotiation with 1 buyer and n
sellers. The buyer maintains a separate negotiation thread with each seller. Each of
these threads however still follows an alternating offers protocol, so the agents are
still restricted. In [35] bilateral negotiations are modeled in continuous time, without
a strict protocol. They assume that the decision of an agent to make a proposal is
determined by external factors, which they model as a random variable. Also [42]
describes several alternative protocols for multilateral negotiations.
We consider however none of these protocols satisfactory for two reasons: firstly,
because they make a strict distinction between buyers and sellers, which may not
always exist in true negotiations (e.g. in the stock market people act both as buyers
and as sellers). Secondly, they seem to be designed with the specific goal of making
things easier for the designer of the experiments and the agents, while they ignore the
fact that in real-world negotiations the players are autonomous and may therefore
decide not to follow the protocol. Therefore, we here assume a different protocol,
which is less strict.
5.1 Definition of the Protocol
The Unstructured Communication Protocol applies to environments with any num-
ber of negotiating agents that propose joint plans to each other. A plan can involve
any number of agents. When an agent proposes a plan this proposal is sent to all the
other agents participating in the plan. Other agents, which do not receive the pro-
posal, do not know anything about it, until the plan is executed (if ever). The agents
are committed to the plan once all agents participating in the plan have accepted it.
At each moment each agent i can propose any plan, or accept any plan earlier
proposed to i by any other agent j. When an agent has proposed or accepted a
proposal it is still allowed to withdraw this proposal or acceptance again, as long as
it is not committed to the plan yet.
The protocol defines two utterances that the agents can make: ‘accept’ and
‘reject’.
Definition 7 An utterance is a tuple of the following form: (′accept′, i, J , p, t) or
(′reject′, i, J , p, t) with i ∈ A, J ⊆ A, p ∈ 2O and t ∈ R. The agent i is called the
sender, the set J is the set of receivers, p is the accepted or rejected plan, and t ∈ R
is the time stamp: the time at which the utterance is made.
We do not explicitly define a ‘propose’ utterance. Instead, an agent proposes a plan
by sending an ‘accept’ message. So we say informally that an agent is proposing a
plan if it is the first to express an ‘accept’ utterance for that plan. The reason for this
is that adding a ‘propose’ message would mean that we would also have to add the
rule to the protocol that an agent cannot accept a deal before it has been proposed,
while the main idea of the protocol is to enforce as few rules as possible.
Definition 8 A set of utterances C is called a conversation if it does not contain
two utterances with the same sender and the same time stamp (an agent cannot
make two utterances at the same time).
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Definition 9 For any given time t we say a plan p is accepted in conversation C by
agent i if there is an utterance (′accept′, i, J , p, t1) ∈ C with t1 ≤ t and no utterance
(′reject′, i, J , p, t2) ∈ C with t1 < t2 ≤ t for any J .
Definition 10 Given the deadline tdead , we say the participating agents of a plan
p are committed to the plan if there exists a t < tdead at which all agents in pa(p)
have accepted it and none of these agents is already committed to another plan p′
that makes p unfeasible.
We now stress a number of important properties of this protocol. Note that all of
these properties indeed follow implicitly from the fact that the protocol is entirely
defined by the four definitions above.
A proposed plan may involve more than two agents. This is different from most
previous work in automated negotiations as one usually assumes only bilateral deals,
even if there are more than two agents negotiating.
A proposal may be sent to any subset J of agents. However, if an agent i that
participates in the proposed plan is not contained in J it will never receive the
proposal and therefore never be able to accept it. Therefore it does not make sense
to send a proposal to J if J does not contain pa(p). Nevertheless we do not force
the agents to include pa(p) in J , because we leave this responsibility to the agents
themselves.
Agents can make more than one deal. Negotiations do not stop after a deal has
been made, so agents can continue making more deals. However, a new deal cannot
be conflicting with any previously made deals (e.g. once you have sold a car, you
cannot sell the same car again to another customer).
Agents can change their minds and reject proposals they earlier accepted, as long
as they are not committed to it yet. When an agent accepts a plan, this is not
considered a binding agreement until all other agents participating in the plan have
also accepted it. Therefore, an agent can reject an earlier accepted plan to prevent
from getting committed to it. Note however that the last definition implies that once
an agent is committed to a plan, it stays committed to it, even if it expresses a ‘reject’
utterance afterwards. A possible extension of the protocol could be to give agents
the option to include an expiration time with every ‘accept’ message, meaning the
proposal will automatically be rejected if it has not yet been accepted by all other
participating agents after this expiration time. We have however not included this
in our current work, to keep things simple.
The agents in this protocol do not take turns. An agent can accept or reject any
proposal at any time; it does not have to wait for ‘its turn’. Moreover, this means
that after making a proposal an agent does not have to wait for a counter-proposal,
it can already make new proposals even before any agent has replied to the first
proposal.
Agents are not obliged to reply to proposals. If an agent does not want to accept a
received proposal, it may or may not explicitly reject it. The agent may simply ignore
the proposal without ever replying. Therefore, when an agent has made a proposal
and waits for reply, it should decide for itself how long to wait for this reply. If it
takes too long, the agent should consider the proposal as rejected, but it is up to
itself when to do so.
When an agent makes a new proposal, it does not have to be compatible with
any of the proposals it made before. This means that if one of the proposed plans
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is executed, other proposed plans may become unfeasible. It is up to the agents
themselves to determine whether standing proposals are still feasible or not.
5.2 Enforcement of Commitments
In any automated negotiation scenario there needs to be some kind of system that
enforces the fulfillments of the agents’ commitments. This can be either by impos-
ing a punishment to agents that violate their commitments, or by simply making it
impossible to violate a commitment. Without such an enforcement system, commit-
ments would not have any formal meaning and rational agents would determine their
strategies according to ordinary non-cooperative game theory without agreements.
Enforcement could be taken care of by, for example, an electronic institution
[5], but we will not go into any detail on this. For our experiments we have simply
implemented our agents to always fulfill their commitments.
5.3 Motivation for the Protocol
The reason that we have chosen this unstructured protocol is that we think that it
resembles the way people negotiate in the real world. This protocol may be considered
inconvenient for designers of agents, but this reflects the problems that negotiators
also face in the real world. For example, if you make somebody an offer by e-mail,
you have no guarantee that the recipient will ever reply to your mail. If he doesn’t
reply, you never know for sure whether the receiver is still deliberating over the offer,
or is simply ignoring it. An agent implemented for the unstructured communication
protocol is therefore much more robust against unexpected human behavior.
Also, the possibility of making several proposals that are mutually incompatible
is very common in the real world. Think for example of a real estate vendor that
offers a house to several potential customers. Obviously, he cannot sell the same
house to all of them, so the customer who reacts first, or bids the highest price,
wins. For all other costumers the deal then becomes unfeasible.
6 The Negotiating Salesmen Problem
We will now give an example of a negotiation problem to which our approach applies
and which cannot be handled by existing algorithms. It is a new, artificial problem
that we have used as a test case for our algorithm. We call this problem the Negotiat-
ing Salesmen Problem (NSP). It resembles the multiple Traveling Salesmen Problem
(mTSP) described in [7], but with the main difference that each agent in the NSP
is only interested in minimizing its individual path, while in the mTSP the agents
intend to minimize the total length of all the agents’ paths together. Therefore, un-
like the mTSP, the NSP is a game in which the agents are opponents. However,
it is a game in which the agents are allowed to make agreements with each other.
After giving the definition we will show that it is a negotiation problem as defined
in Section 4.
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6.1 Definition
The idea is that several agents (the salesmen) need to visit a set of cities. The
salesmen all start at the same city (the home city), and all other cities should be
visited by at least one agent. Initially, each city is assigned to one salesman that has
to visit it. The salesmen are then allowed to exchange some of their cities, so that
they are able to decrease the distances they have to cover. For example: if a city v
is assigned to agent α, but α prefers to visit another city v′, which is assigned to
agent β, then α may propose to β to exchange v for v′. If β however also prefers to
have v′ over v it will not accept this deal. If no other agent wants to accept v either,
then α is obliged to travel along city v. However, we impose the restriction that not
all cities are allowed to be exchanged. The cities that can be exchanged are referred
to as the interchangeable cities, while the cities that cannot be exchanged are called
the fixed cities. We will now give a formal definition of this problem.
Definition 11 An instance of the NSP is a tuple 〈G, v0,A,F , I , 0, tdead〉, which
consists of: a weighted graph G, a marked vertex v0 of the graph, a set of agents A,
a set of fixed cities F , a set of interchangeable cities I , an initial distribution of cities
0 and a deadline tdead . These components are further explained below.
G is a finite, complete, weighted, undirected graph: G = 〈V ,w〉 with V the set
of vertices (the cities) and w the weight-function that assigns a cost to each edge:
w : V ×V → R+ and that satisfies the triangle inequality:
∀ a, b, c ∈ V : w(a, c) ≤ w(a, b) + w(b, c)
One of the vertices is marked as the home city: v0 ∈ V . Each agent has to
start and end its trajectory in this city. We use the symbol V to denote the set
of destinations, that is: all cities except the home city: V = V \ {v0}. The set of
destinations is partitioned into two disjoint subsets: F and I , so: V = F ∪ I and
F∩I = ∅. They are referred to as the set of fixed cities and the set of interchangeable
cities respectively.
The set of agents (the salesmen) is denoted by A = {α, β, ...}. Each destination
is initially assigned to an agent, by the function 0 : V → A. We use the symbol V i
to denote the subset of V consisting of all cities that are assigned by 0 to agent i.
V i = {v ∈ V | 0(v) = i}. V i is referred to as agent i’s set of preassigned cities.
The definitions above imply that for each agent its set of preassigned cities can be
further subdivided into: V i = Fi ∪ Ii where Fi is defined as V i ∩F and Ii is defined
as V i ∩ I .
Finally, the instance includes a real number tdead that represents the deadline for
the negotiations. Agents are allowed to negotiate over the assignment of cities, until
this deadline has passed.
Definition 12 An outcome of an instance of the NSP is a map  : V → A such that
the restrictions of 0 and  to F are equal: ∀ v ∈ F : 0(v) = (v).
The set of cities assigned to agent i in outcome  is denoted as V ,i :
V ,i = {v ∈ V | (v) = i}
This means that in the outcome the cities are distributed between the agents ac-
cording to , but the fixed cities F are still assigned to their original agents. So in
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the solution, the interchangeable cities are redistributed: V = V ,α∪V ,β ∪ ..., while
the fixed cities are not: V ,i ∩ Fi = Fi .
Each agent has a preference over the set of outcomes, defined by a cost function.
In order to define this cost function we first need to introduce some more definitions.
Definition 13 Given any finite set S = {s1, s2, . . . sk} of size k, and a permutation
pi of the integers 1 to k we say a cycle TS,pi through S is an ordered sequence of size
k consisting of the elements of S :
TS,pi = (spi(1), spi(2), . . . spi(k))
We use the notation TS to denote the set of all cycles through S .
Definition 14 If S is a set of nodes from a weighted graph, with the weights denoted
by w(si , sj), then the length c(TS,pi) of a cycle is defined as:




With these definitions we can now define the cost function ci for an agent i over
the set of outcomes.
Definition 15 The cost function ci for an agent i is defined as:
ci() = minT∈TV,i∪{v0} c(T) (2)
In words, this means that the cost of an agent i for a given assignment of cities 
is defined as the shortest path through the cities assigned to i, including the home
city.
6.2 Reasons for Rejection
We would like to stress that when an agent α makes a proposal to another agent β
that benefits them both, β may still decide to reject the offer, for several reasons.
Firstly because β may be planning a counter proposal that reduces his individual
cost even more, but that would become impossible after accepting α’s proposal. Since
both agents explore the agreement space independently they have a different view
of their possibilities and bargaining power. Secondly, agent β may also choose to
make a deal with another agent γ, which is incompatible with the offer made by α.
Thirdly, agent β may simply want to wait and continue searching for better deals.
6.3 The NSP as a Negotiation Problem
We show now that the NSP is indeed a negotiation problem as defined in Section 4.
In the NSP a world state is defined as an assignment of interchangeable cities to
agents:  : V → A (we have intentionally chosen to use the letter  both for world
states, and for assignments in the NSP, since an assignment of cities is in fact a world
state). An action ac ∈ O in the NSP consists of one agent i giving an interchangeable
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city v to another agent j, so it is a triple (i, v, j), with i, j ∈ A, i 6= j and v ∈ I . The
set of actions Oi that agent i can choose to execute consists only of actions in which
a city is given to i. The fact that i giving a city to j is considered as an action
executed by j rather than by i, is because this action decreases the cost of i and
therefore we can assume that i will never object to such an action, so j can perform
this action autonomously.
O = {(i, v, j) ∈ A× I ×A | i 6= j}
Oj = {(i, v, j) ∈ A× I × {j} | i 6= j}
The execution of an action alters the state of the world in the following way: if we
have an action ac = (i, v, j), and we define ′ = ac(), then:
′(v) = j and ∀ z ∈ V \ {v} : ′(z) = (z)
In words: the city v is re-assigned to agent j, while all other cities remain assigned to
the same owner as before. We may need to warn the reader here not to get confused
because of the fact that actions and plans are defined as maps from world states to
world states, while in the NSP a world state is itself also defined as a map, namely
from the set of cities to the set of agents.
In the NSP the cost function fi() is the length of the shortest path through all
cities assigned to agent i under assignment .
In the NSP a single action is only feasible if the agent who gives away a city
actually owns that city. A plan is considered feasible if each individual action is
feasible and if no city is given away twice:
p ∈ fea()⇔ ∀(i, v, j) ∈ p : (v) = i ∧ ∀(i, v, j), (i ′, v′, j ′) ∈ p : v 6= v′
The definition that a plan is only feasible if no city is given away twice, is introduced
to discard plans in which one agent gives away the same city twice. At first sight
this condition might seem too strict, because it also discards plans in which an agent
i gives a city v to an agent j, and then j passes v on to another agent k. However,
that would be equivalent to the action in which i gives v directly to k, so it can
be modeled as one single, feasible action. Note that it is still possible for a city to
be passed on from one agent to another in two separate plans, but we just discard
proposals in which our agent proposes such a two-step deal in one single plan.
6.4 The NSP without Agreements
As explained in the introduction, the fact that players are allowed to make agree-
ments allows them to reach efficient solutions that would otherwise be unstable. To
illustrate this we here show that if we would not allow the agents to make agreements,
the NSP would become trivial and the outcome would be inefficient.
We call the non-cooperative variant of the NSP the multiple traveling salesmen
problem (nc-mTSP). Just as in the NSP every agent in the nc-mTSP has a set of
fixed and interchangeable cities, and all definitions are the same. However, the agents
do not communicate and cannot make any binding commitments. To make sure that
this game is well defined we furthermore assume it is a turn taking game with a
fixed number of rounds, where in each round, one player has the option (but not the
obligation) to take one or more interchangeable cities from any other player. For each
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player the final payoff of the game is the negative of the length of the shortest path
through all cities he owns at the end. We now claim that the equilibrium strategy of
this game is trivial.
Lemma 1 In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the nc-mTSP no player ever takes
any city from any other player.
Proof
The player whose turn it is in the last round would not want to take
any city from any other player, since this could only increase its cost.
Knowing this, the player in the second last round would also not want
to take any city. By backward induction it follows that the same holds
in every round of the game.
6.5 The NSP as a Testbed for Real World Negotiations
The NSP is not meant as a realistic model for real traveling agents, but rather as a
testbed to test algorithms for general, complex, negotiation scenarios. We will show
now that a number of properties of real-world negotiations are also present in the
NSP.
In many real world negotiations the utility of a set of issues is non-additive.
That is: the value of a contract depends on the combination of issues. For example:
when booking a holiday you need both a plane ticket to your destination and a hotel
booking. The hotel booking is worthless without the plane ticket and vice versa. So
the value of having both a plane ticket and a hotel booking is higher than just the
sum of their individual values.
This non-additivity also occurs in the NSP. For example: if agent α currently
owns cities v1 and v2 and there are two cities v3 and v4 which are both farther away
from the home city than v1 and v2. Then α is not interested in exchanging one of
its cities for one of the other two cities. However, it could be that v3 and v4 lie very
close to each other and therefore it would be profitable to exchange both v1 and v2
for both v3 and v4.
The fixed cities in the NSP represent the fact that in real negotiations different
agents have different preferences. Without fixed cities, every agent would have exactly
the same utility profile: the path between cities v1, v2 and v3 is equally long for every
agent. However, because each agent also has its own fixed cities, every agent would
have to traverse a different path even if they would visit the same interchangeable
cities. One agent may prefer to visit v1,v2 and v3 because they are close to his fixed
city v4, while another agent may prefer to visit cities v5,v6 and v7, because they are
closer to his fixed city v8. If one wants to model a negotiation scenario in which the
preferences of the other agents are unknown, one can impose the restriction that
position of any fixed cities is only known to the agent that owns it.
In real-world negotiations it is often very hard to assign a precise utility value to
a deal. This is captured in the NSP by the fact that for each possible deal the agent
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has to solve a traveling salesman problem for each agent involved in it. This is very
hard, and often it is better to make only a quick approximation rather than to do
an exact calculation. Of course, in the NSP the hardness of calculating utility stems
from the fact that it is computationally hard, while for many real world problems it
is caused by lack of information, but the point is that in both cases the utility can
only be approximated.
Finally, we would like to stress that the size of the agreement space in the NSP is
very large. If the number of agents is denoted as a, and the number of interchange-
able cities per agent by m, then there are in total a · m cities. A proposal in the
NSP may assign an agent to every city, so there are aam possible proposals. In the
largest experiment we have conducted (see Section 10) there were 20 agents and 10
interchangeable cities per agent so there were 20200 possible proposals.
7 The NB3 Algorithm
Branch & Bound (BB) is capable of searching through large spaces efficiently and
has reasonable solutions available at any time. When searching for the best joint
plan to propose, it is usually unnecessary to examine each possible plan. One can
often, after examining only a partial joint plan, already discard all full joint plans
that contain this partial plan. Furthermore, as the algorithm is running, it yields
solutions that get closer to the optimal solution, so at any time it has a solution
available that at least approximates the optimum. The fact that BB allows one to
discard large parts of the search space and that it is an anytime algorithm makes it
ideal to apply to our domain. For an in-depth description of BB algorithms we refer
to [25,37].
We propose a family of negotiation algorithms called NB3 that apply BB to
explore the agreement space and discard those parts of it that contain sets of unde-
sirable solutions. We next explain the different components of NB3 assuming that
it runs on an agent called α. The other agents might also run a copy of NB3, but
they might just as well run any other negotiation algorithm, or they could even be
human.
7.1 The Search Tree
An agent that runs the NB3 algorithm builds a search tree which is explored accord-
ing to a best-first strategy. Each arc between a node and its parent is labeled by a
certain action from the set of possible actions O. Each node can then be interpreted
in four equivalent ways:
– Each node n represents the plan that consists of all the actions that label the
arcs in the path from the root to n; this plan is denoted by path(n). The root
node corresponds to the empty plan.
– Equivalently, each node represents a set of plans,2 denoted plans(n), consisting
of all plans that can be constructed by adding more actions to path(n). The root
2 As mentioned before, to keep the discussion simple we assume that the order in which
actions are taken is irrelevant for the outcome of the state of the world, even though our
algorithm would work just as well without this restriction. Therefore, we see a plan as a set of
actions, rather than a sequence of actions. So a set of plans is a set of sets of actions.
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Fig. 1 The search tree. Node n represents the partial plan consisting of the actions ac1, ac4
and ac6.
node then represents the set of all possible plans and the children of a given node
form a partition of the set of plans represented by the parent node. So if a node
n has children n1, n2, n3, then plans(n) = plans(n1) ∪ plans(n2) ∪ plans(n3).
– A third way of interpreting nodes is to see them as world states. The root node
then represents the initial world state 0 and node n represents the world state n
that results from letting path(n) act on the initial world state: n = (path(n))(0).
– Finally, each node represents the set En of all world states that can be reached
by the plans in plans(n):
 ∈ En iff ∃ p ∈ plans(n) : p(0) = 
The root node represents the set of all world states that can be reached by letting
any plan act on the initial world state 0. If a node n has children n1, n2, n3,
then En = En1 ∪ En2 ∪ En3 .
To summarize: each node can be identified with a plan path(n), a set of plans
plans(n), a world state n , and a set of world states En . The relationship between
these objects is given by:
plans(n) = fea(n) = fea((path(n))(0))
En = {p(0) | p ∈ plans(n)}
In Figure 1 the node marked n represents the partial plan consisting of actions ac1,
ac4 and ac6, so path(n) = {ac1, ac4, ac6}. The set plans(n) consists of all feasible
plans that include these three actions. The world state n is the world state that
would result from letting these actions act on the initial world state, and the set of
world states En consist of all the world states that can still be realized after these
actions have been executed.
7.2 Making Decisions
In our environment the commitments among the negotiators have to be made during
the search process. This is because an agent cannot wait until it finds the optimal
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plan before negotiating with other agents, as it might then be too late to get any com-
mitment from them: they might have already signed commitments for incompatible
plans. Therefore, a trade-off exists between optimality and commitment availability.
When α receives a proposal from another agent, it has to decide whether to
accept it or not, but it may not take this decision immediately. It may prefer to
expand the tree a bit more, in order to see if it can find a better alternative to the
proposed plan. We see that the more the agent explores the tree before making any
commitments, the more likely it is that it will find better plans. But, on the other
hand, the less likely it becomes that it will get the other agents to accept those plans.
How to solve this trade-off is a key decision when implementing an instance of NB3.
Another important decision for any implementation of NB3 is the question of
which node to split and how to split it. This may depend on the ongoing negotiation
thread. For example, when an agent (say agent β) rejects a plan proposed by α,
this means the actions by β should get less priority in future selections to be made
by the algorithm. The idea behind this is that if you are under time pressure and
there are several negotiation partners, you would be more inclined to negotiate with
those partners that are showing more interest in reaching an agreement with you.
Otherwise, you would be wasting your time. Moreover, if someone is not willing to
concede, you can put him under pressure by suspending negotiations with him and
continue your negotiations with others. In Section 8 and 9 we show how we have
solved these issues for a particular implementation of NB3.
7.3 Bounding
Branch & Bound algorithms require that each node n compute upper- and lower
bounds for the cost function in the subspace corresponding to this node. In the case
of negotiations, however, an agent should not only take its own cost into account
but also the cost functions for its negotiation partners, because good solutions can
often only be reached in cooperation with other agents, that is: a solution is only
reasonable if it also decreases the costs to the other agents sufficiently. For this
reason, each node does not only compute bounds for the cost of agent α, but also
for every other agent.
The algorithm, running on agent α, is thus assumed to have a model3 of the cost
functions fi of the other agents, and uses this model to calculate for every node n
and every agent i ∈ A the following bounds (we assume that the goal is to minimize
a cost function and that the current state of the world is 0. Furthermore we define
n = (path(n))(0)):
– For each node n and agent i an upper bound: ubi(n). This is the maximum
cost i may incur from any plan compatible with the plan path(n).
ubi(n) = maxp⊂2O{fi(p(n)) | path(n) ⊆ p}
– For each node n and agent i an intermediate value: ei(n). The cost agent i
incurs if exactly the plan path(n) is executed and no other actions.
ei(n) = fi(n) = fi((path(n))(0)).
3 We will not discuss how it could obtain such a model, because there are many ways to do
this and depends on the domain. In the case of NSP this is simple, because it is known that
each agent wants to minimize its path.
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– For each node n and agent i a lower bound: lbi(n). The minimum cost that i
may incur from any plan compatible with the plan path(n).
lbi(n) = minp⊂2O{fi(p(n)) | path(n) ⊆ p}
Lemma 2 The upper bound is decreasing, and the lower bound is increasing. That
is: for any node n and any child n′ of n we have:
ubi(n) ≥ ubi(n′) and lbi(n) ≤ lbi(n′)
This implies that the lower bound for agent i of the root node is the lowest cost
agent i could ever achieve. Below we indicate the root node with n0.
Definition 16 The global lower bound glbi of an agent i is the lower bound for agent
i in the root node.
glbi = lbi(n0)
The following lemma follows directly from the definition of the reservation value in
Section 4 and the definition of the intermediate value.
Lemma 3 The reservation value of an agent i is equal to the intermediate value of
the root node:
rvi = fi(0) = ei(n0)
Proof
This follows directly by combining the definition of the intermediate
value with the definition of the reservation value given in Section 4.
The bounds defined here, cannot always be calculated exactly, for two reasons.
First, because α might not have complete knowledge of the world state and of the
other agents’ cost functions fi . And second, because the time restrictions might
make it impossible for α to compute these quantities exactly in real time, so α may
only be able to estimate them. To be clear, in the rest of this paper we will add a
superscript letter α to any quantity if it does not represent the exact value, but only
the approximation that α makes of this quantity. So for example ubβ(n) indicates
the theoretical value of agent β’s upper bound of node n, while ubαβ (n) denotes the
approximation that α makes about agent β’s upper bound.
The intermediate value of a node is the cost that the agent will have to pay if
exactly the actions in the path from this node to the root node are executed. So if
eα(n) ≥ rvα the plan path(n) is not profitable for α. Therefore we say a node n is
rational for agent α iff eα(n) < rvα (remember our assumption in Section 4 that
plans that do not involve agent α do not influence α’s costs).
Definition 17 We say agent α believes a node n to be rational for agent i iff
eαi (n) < rvαi .
Definition 18 We say α believes a node n is individually rational iff it believes
it is rational for all agents participating in path(n).
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7.4 Searching and Pruning
Since NB3 performs a best-first search, we need a heuristic h that calculates a value
for each node: h(n) ∈ R≥0 to rank the nodes. We call this heuristic the expansion
heuristic. Each time after splitting a node the algorithm picks the leaf node with the
highest expansion heuristic from the tree to be split next. The value of h depends
on the values of the bounds defined above. The precise way in which h is calculated
from the bounds might depend on the domain, but in Section 7.5 we give an example
of such a function that is domain independent.
The lower bound is used for pruning: it defines the lowest cost an agent could
possibly achieve in any descendant of the node. If lbαi (n) > rvαi for some agent i
participating in path(n), it means that not only this plan is unprofitable for agent i,
but also any plan that extends path(n) would be unprofitable for i, so in that case
agent i would never agree with any plan descending from node n and therefore this
node can be pruned. Of course α only has estimations of the true bounds for the
utilities of the other agents, so it is essential that these estimations are good.
Note that for general BB algorithms a node is pruned if its lower bound exceeds
a global upper bound, which is defined as the lowest upper bound among all leaf
nodes. This is however not the case in NB3. The reason for this is that, if we look
at the node with the lowest upper bound, we cannot be sure that we can actually
achieve the commitment of its corresponding plan, since we are never guaranteed
that its other participating agents will agree on it. Therefore, we use the reservation
value rather than the global upper bound to prune nodes.
One should note that the kind of pruning described here does not have to be
done explicitly. After all, the heuristic h determines which node to expand next, so
as long as we make sure that h(n) = 0 whenever lbαi (n) > rvαi for some participating
agent i, this node will always have lowest priority, which is essentially the same as
being pruned.
However, NB3 also applies another form of pruning which is done explicitly.
Whenever agent α gets committed to a plan p, all actions in O that are incompatible
with the actions in p become unfeasible so α can prune all nodes that have any of
the incompatible actions in their paths to the root.
7.5 The Expansion Heuristic
One of the crucial properties of NB3 is the expansion heuristic h, that determines in
which order the nodes are to be split. We will now discuss the default implementation
of this heuristic, which is independent of the domain in which the algorithm is used.
It can however be improved for specific cases where knowledge about the domain
may help guiding the search.
Definition 19 The set of participating agents of a node n is denoted as pa(n)
and is defined as the set of participating agents of its corresponding plan: pa(n) =
pa(path(n)).
Definition 20 The utility of a node n for agent i is the difference between the
reservation value and the intermediate value: ui(n) = rvi − ei(n).
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The goal of NB3 is to maximize the utility (i.e. minimize the cost) of agent α.
However, α needs the cooperation of other agents in order to execute plans, so it is
not enough to look only at the utility of α. It is better to say that the search algorithm
aims to find the plan for which the expectation value of α’s utility is maximized. That
is: the plan for which the product of α’s utility and the probability that all other
participating agents accept it, is maximal.
Definition 21 The node value Vαα (n) of a node n for agent α is the utility of the
node for α times the probability that the corresponding plan gets accepted by all
participating agents.




Here Pα(acci(x)) stands for the probability, estimated by α, that agent i would
accept a plan that yields a cost of x. Of course it is impossible to calculate this
probability exactly, but we will see below how it can be estimated.
NB3 aims to generate nodes with high node value. Now the question is: which
node should be expanded in order to generate descendant nodes with high node
value? The expansion heuristic of a node n is therefore defined as the highest node
value that we expect to find among the descendants n′ of n.
h(n) = Vαα (n∗) = max{Vαα (n′) | n′ ∈ desc(n)} (4)
with n∗ = arg maxn′∈desc(n)Vαα (n′) and desc(n) denoting the set of nodes in the
subtree under n. Of course, when the algorithm is calculating h(n), the subtree under
n has not been generated yet so it cannot directly calculate the value Vαα (n∗), but
with some assumptions it can be estimated, as shown below. For this we need one
more definition:
Definition 22 The offer value off αi of an agent i is the highest cost that i would
incur from all the plans so far proposed or accepted by i.
off αi = max{f αi (p(0)) | p ∈ acceptαi }
Here acceptαi denotes the set of all plans (known to α) that were proposed or accepted
by agent i.
The offer value represents the highest price that agent i has offered to pay, so far. Now
we will show how, for any node n, NB3 estimates the probability Pα(acci(eαi (n))). It
is safe to assume that i would never accept a plan for which its cost eαi (n) is higher
than its reservation value rvαi . Also it is reasonable to assume that this probability
decreases as the cost eαi for agent i increases. Furthermore, since agent i has already
offered to incur a cost of off αi one can assume that i would accept any proposal for
which i receives a cost lower than, or equal to off αi . Therefore, this probability is




1 if x ≤ off αi
rvαi −x
rvαi −offαi if off
α
i < x < rvαi
0 if x ≥ rvαi
(5)
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With this formula, we can calculate the probability that an agent will accept a
plan path(n) that yields a cost of eαi (n). However, in order to use (4) we need to
calculate the probability that n∗ will be accepted, while n∗ has not been generated
yet, and therefore we cannot know the values eαi (n∗). Therefore, for n∗ we estimate
the probability of acceptance as follows (to simplify notation from now on we denote




Pα(acci(x)) · Pα(e∗ = x)dx (6)
In order to calculate this, the algorithm then needs to estimate a probability dis-
tribution Pα(e∗ = x). From the definition of the lower bound it follows that e∗
can never be lower than the lower bound lbαi (n) of n. Furthermore, the algorithm
assumes that the value e∗ will not be higher than eαi (n) (so it makes the optimistic
assumption that each node n always has some descendant node with lower inter-
mediate value). Therefore, the probability distribution P(e∗ = x), is modeled as a
uniform distribution between eαi (n) and lbαi (n). We can then rewrite (6) (we further







Finally, we need to estimate the value of uαα(n∗). We know that n∗ is by definition
in the subtree under n, which means that the plan path(n) is a subplan of the plan
path(n∗), so we can assume that uαα(n∗) is not very different from uαα(n). Therefore,
we make the simplifying assumption that uαα(n∗) = uαα(n). Now we can calculate
the expansion heuristic by combining (3) and (4):




which can be calculated explicitly by combining it with (5) and (7).
One very important remark we would like to state here, is that every time an
agent makes a proposal or accepts a proposal its offer value can change, which means
the expansion heuristic of every node in the tree changes. If an agent concedes, its
offer value increases, and therefore the expansion heuristic of every node in which
this agent is participating increases. In other words: if β concedes, it becomes more
attractive for α to explore plans in which β is participating. We see thus that not only
is the negotiation influenced by the search, but also the other way around: the search
is influenced by the offers that are made by the other agents. Search and negotiation
have become intimately intertwined with each other. This is a unique property of
NB3.
7.6 Modeling Preferences of Other Agents
As explained above, the NB3 algorithm requires a model of the cost functions of the
other agents. We do not see this as a limitation because we believe that knowledge
of your opponents’ preferences is essential in almost all negotiation scenarios. If a
negotiator does not know anything about the preferences of its opponent, it is almost
impossible to make any sensible proposal.
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Agents may base their opponent models on prior knowledge of the domain and
the opponents, on the proposals made by the other agents during the negotiations,
on arguments exchanged between the agents, or on any other form of information
provided by the other agents (see for example [43]).
In the case of NSP modeling the opponents’ cost functions is easy, because we
know that each agent is only interested in making its own path as short as possible
and the positions of all cities are known. In many other problems it may be much
more difficult to know the preferences of the other agents. Especially since agents
might hide their preferences or lie about them.
In this paper we have intentionally chosen to use a domain in which opponent
modeling is trivial, because we want to focus on the other aspects of the negotiation
algorithm. We consider modeling the preferences of the opponents a domain specific
matter and therefore we will not discuss how to do this for domains other than NSP.
Moreover, the problem of modeling opponents has already been studied many times
before, for example in [18] and [47]. In order to use NB3 in any realistic domain
it should be augmented with such an opponent modeling algorithm to obtain the
bounds of the tree nodes.
8 Negotiation Strategy
In this section we explain the negotiation strategy applied by NB3 for negotiations
under the unstructured communication protocol. Although NB3 applies a model
of the opponents’ utility functions, it does not apply any model of the opponents’
negotiation strategies. We leave that as future work.
8.1 Proposing and Accepting
As the search tree is expanding, some nodes that are being generated represent
individually rational plans. The agent needs to determine which of them to propose
to the other agents.
The question when to accept an offer and what to propose has been solved
theoretically, under specific assumptions such as the presence of a discount factor
that decreases the utility as time passes and the assumption that the players follow
the alternating offers protocol, in [41]. For more general settings such as ours however,
there is no known optimal strategy.
In many previous studies it is assumed the negotiators have strictly opposing
interests. For example: a car salesman aims to sell the car for the highest possible
price, while the client aims to buy it for the lowest possible price. In these cases, both
negotiators usually start by proposing a selfish plan, but, as time passes, concede
towards each other, reaching some intermediate solution. The amount of utility that
an agent asks from its opponent at a certain time is called the ‘aspiration level’ [12].
The intuitive idea behind such strategies is that you try to guess how much the
other is willing to concede and try to hide how much you are willing to concede.
You don’t want to concede too much, but if you concede too little your utility may
decrease (in case there is a discount factor) or your opponent may prefer to continue
negotiating with other players (in case of multilateral negotiations). Moreover, in the
specific setting of this paper, the players need to search for good proposals at run
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time which makes it even more important not to concede too quickly, as you may
find better options as time is passing.
The assumption of strictly opposing interests implies that ‘concession’ can be
defined in two equivalent ways: either as ‘demanding less utility from the opponent’,
or as ‘offering more utility to the opponent’. In our situation this is no longer true.
In our scenario the search for possible agreements takes place simultaneously with
the negotiations meaning that new solutions are being found during the negotiations
that may dominate earlier found solutions. Therefore agents sometimes propose new
offers that increase their own utilities as well as their opponents’. Moreover, in most
existing work when an agent receives a proposal it only has two options: to reject it
or to accept it. In our situation however, there is a third option: to continue searching
for better solutions.
These differences motivate us to define a new negotiation strategy, in which the
agent takes into account not one, but two aspiration levels. We will explain this in
the rest of this section. In order to keep the explanation simple we first present this
negotiation strategy for the case of bilateral negotiations and then generalize it to
the multilateral case.
8.1.1 Bilateral Negotiation Strategy
During the negotiations agent α regularly needs to make a choice between proposing
an offer, accepting an offer, or continue searching. The agent bases its decision on
three values: the time t passed since the start of the negotiations, the normalized
utility u¯αα it receives from a possible proposal and the normalized utility u¯αβ the
opponent β receives from a possible proposal.
Definition 23 The normalized utility of a plan p for agent i, in world state 0,
is defined as the utility divided by the maximum utility it could possibly achieve:
u¯i(p) = rvi−fi(p(0))rvi−glbi .
To make a decision, agent α compares these utility values with two values, denoted as
mαα(t) (the self-aspiration-level) and mαβ (t) (the opponent-aspiration-level) respec-
tively, which are fixed, time dependent functions. Note that although mαβ represents
an aspiration level for the utility of β, this value exists in the mind of α. It is the
amount of utility that α believes to be necessary to offer to β.
Definition 24 A plan p is more selfish than plan p′ iff u¯αα(p) > u¯αα(p′). For a
given time instant t we say p is selfish enough iff u¯αα(p) > mαα(t). Given a set of
plans P, the plan p ∈ P that maximizes u¯αα(p) is called the most selfish plan of P.
Definition 25 A plan p is more altruistic than plan p′ iff u¯αβ (p) > u¯αβ (p′). For a
given time instant t we say p is altruistic enough if u¯αβ (p) > mαβ (t). Given a set
of plans P, the plan p ∈ P that maximizes u¯αβ (p) is called the most altruistic plan
of P.
Notice that ‘selfish’ and ‘altruistic’ as defined here are not necessarily each other’s
opposites. If plan p yields more utility than p′, for both negotiators, p is more selfish
and more altruistic than plan p′.
At given moments t separated by time intervals of fixed length, α decides what
to do: to propose a new plan, to accept a previously proposed plan, or to continue
searching for better plans (the length of these intervals is a parameter of the algo-
rithm). This decision is taken according to the following 6-step strategy:
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1. First α determines the set X of all plans it has found so far and believes to be
individually rational.
2. Then, it determines the subset Y ⊂ X of all plans in X that are altruistic enough.
3. If Y is not empty, α picks the plan p ∈ Y that is most selfish. If on the other
hand Y is empty, then α picks the plan p ∈ X that is most altruistic.
4. Next, α determines the set Z of all plans that have been proposed to it by other
agents. From this set it picks the most selfish plan p′ ∈ Z .
5. From the two plans p and p′, it then picks the one which is most selfish.
6. Finally, α checks whether the plan chosen in the previous step is selfish enough.
If yes, then this plan will be proposed or accepted. If however this plan is not
selfish enough, the agent will continue to search for better plans.
To summarize this: α will only accept or propose any plan that is individually rational
and selfish enough. It will only propose a new plan p if there is no standing proposal
p′ proposed to α that is more selfish than p (because then it prefers to accept p′).
And from all candidate plans it could propose, it prefers the most selfish plan that is
altruistic enough. If however no plan is altruistic enough, it prefers the plan that is
most altruistic (also see Algorithm 5 in Section 9.5 for a description of this procedure
in pseudo-code.)
Since α should start selfish, and concede as time passes, mαα(t) is a decreasing
function, so that less selfish plans are proposed as time advances, and mαβ (t) is an
increasing function, so that more altruistic plans are proposed as time advances.
Notice that in order to be proposed or accepted, step 6 requires that the plan is
selfish enough, while, because of step 3, it does not need to be altruistic enough. This
is because if α has a plan that is probably not good enough for β to be accepted,
it doesn’t harm much to try and propose it anyway. On the other hand, if α would
propose a plan that yields very little utility for itself, and it gets accepted by β, then
α is committed to this deal, which might make other, more profitable deals in the
future impossible.
For the aspiration levels we have chosen the following expressions:
mαα(t) = 1− e
−a1 ttdead − 1





e−a2 − 1 (10)
Their graphs are plotted in Figure 2. Notice that mαα decreases from 1 to 0 and
mαβ increases from 0 to 1. The higher the values of a1 and a2, the faster the agent
concedes. Therefore a1 and a2 are called the concession degrees. The strategy of the
agent can be adapted by adjusting these two parameters.
The fact that mαα and mαβ go to 1 and 0 respectively makes this strategy a very
weak one for bilateral negotiations, since it can be easily countered by any opponent.
The opponent β would simply not concede, but wait until mαβ is so high that α will
propose a plan that is highly favorable to β. However, one should keep in mind that
this strategy is developed for multilateral negotiations. In the multilateral case, agent
β does not have the opportunity to wait until α makes a highly altruistic offer, since
β has competition from other agents. If β does not concede, α might reach deals with
some of the other agents, leaving β with nothing.
The algorithm intends to find plans for which the opponent-utility is as close as
possible to the opponent-aspiration-level. The self-aspiration level imposes an extra
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Fig. 2 The graphs of mαα and mαβ for several values of a1 and a2.
criterion, that determines whether the plan is selfish enough to be proposed, or
whether it is better to continue searching instead. This solves the trade-off problem
discussed in section 7.2.
Finally, note that this strategy never rejects any proposal. Instead, it simply
ignores bad proposals. The advantage of this is that our agent never has to worry
about the question when to definitely reject a proposal and that it always keeps
every proposal as an option to accept in the future. On the other hand, rejecting
proposals would have the advantage that our agent could inform the other agents
about its preferences which could improve the proposals made by them.
8.1.2 Comparison with Single Aspiration Level
To further justify why we are using two aspiration levels, we will now take a look at
what would happen if one of the two aspiration-levels would be set to zero, so that
there is effectively only one aspiration-level.
In general it can happen that the plan p chosen in step 3 is very unprofitable
for agent α, even though it’s the most selfish one. But step 6 then makes sure that
such a plan is not proposed because it is not selfish enough. Now if mαα would be
zero however, every plan would be considered selfish enough so even bad plans would
be proposed. In simple negotiations, where the entire set of solutions is known, this
would not be a problem because p would simply be the most selfish plan existing, so
there would not exist any better solution for α.
However, in our situation, because the search for good solutions runs simultane-
ously with the negotiations, it is only sure that plan p is the most selfish solution
found so far. It would therefore be better to continue searching than to propose the
bad plan. This is exactly the reason why we have mαα : it determines whether the plan
is selfish enough to propose, or if it is better to continue searching for a better plan
before proposing it. The more time available, the better it is to continue searching.
If however there is very little time left before the deadline, there is little hope of
finding a better plan. Therefore, the selfishness-criterion should become weaker as
the deadline approaches, so mαα must be a decreasing function of time.
Now instead suppose that mαβ is always zero. Each plan would be considered
altruistic enough and the agent would only have the following two options: propose
the most selfish plan (if it is selfish enough) or continue searching until it finds a plan
that is selfish enough. But in this way α might never concede, because there might
exist a lot of very selfish plans. An agent that does not concede at all is generally not
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a good negotiator, especially in a multilateral environment where your opponents
have the possibility to ignore you and come to agreements with each other.
8.1.3 Characterization of Strategies
Our concession strategy is parametric in the two concession degrees. We will now
discuss how the various settings of these parameters would affect negotiations. We
define four strategies by setting the values of a1 and a2 either high or low.
A: low a1, low a2. Greedy agent. Only proposes very selfish plans. If it hasn’t
found any plans that are selfish enough, it prefers to continue searching for them
than to concede.
B: high a1, low a2. Lazy agent. Proposes very selfish plans, but if it can’t find
any, it will propose less selfish plans, rather than to search for better solutions.
C : low a1, high a2. Picky agent. This agent is willing to propose altruistic
plans, but only if they are also selfish, otherwise it prefers to continue searching. So
it keeps searching until it finds a plan that is both very selfish and very altruistic.
D: high a1, high a2. Desperate agent. Concedes fast, even if it costs him a lot
of utility.
Roughly we can say that the higher the value of a1, the less the agent likes to
search. The higher the value of a2, the more altruistic the plans are that the agent
proposes (or is willing to accept). Strategy A should only be played if the agent has
little competition. If the agent knows it has a stronger position than its opponents
it can use this strategy to exploit them. Strategy D on the contrary, should only
be played in a highly competitive environment. If there is a lot of competition it is
better to try to come to an agreement as soon as possible, before the competition
takes away all the good deals.
B and C are more moderate strategies. B should be played if good plans are
scarce. In such an environment it is not likely to find many plans that are better
than your current options, so it is better to give up some utility than to continue
searching for a better plan. If good plans are abundant, it is better to play C . In
that case, if your current options are not good enough, instead of giving up utility
it is better to keep searching a bit more because it is likely that you will find some
better plan.
From basic experimentation we have concluded that good values of the concession
degrees for the NSP are a1 = 2 and a2 = 4 and have fixed these values for our further
experiments in Section 10. We leave a more thorough experimentation to determine
the best values for these parameters as future work.
8.1.4 Multilateral Negotiations
Things become more complicated when we want to apply our strategy to multilateral
negotiations. In order to make the agent capable of multilateral negotiation, we have
chosen a simplified model in which the agent treats the set of all opponents as if
it were one opponent, and then follows the same concession strategy as above. It
defines the opponent-utility of a plan as the product of all the normalized utilities
of the other agents participating in the plan. When choosing whether to propose,
accept, or wait, it applies exactly the same procedure as in the bilateral case, only
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with the extra restriction that u¯αpa(p) is zero if u¯αi is negative for any i ∈ pa(p).
This multilateral concession strategy does not take into account which agents
are involved in the proposals α makes. So when one proposal p1, made by α, is
not accepted, α will try to make a new proposal p2 that gives more utility to its
participating agents than p1 did, even though the agents participating in p2 might be
completely different from the ones in p1. The idea behind this is that α considers all
agents as equivalent. After all, we assume that the agents are unknown, so we cannot
distinguish between them. In the rest of this paper we will denote the opponent
aspiration-level for multilateral negotiations as mαpa instead of mαβ .
A possible way of improving the multilateral strategy, which we leave for future
work, would be to store information about the opponents obtained during the negoti-
ations. We could then make a profile of each opponent and use this to set a different
opponent-aspiration-level for each individual opponent. Furthermore we could try
alternative definitions of u¯αpa, such as the minimum of the opponent-utilities. Again,
we leave this as future work.
9 Branesal: NB3 applied to the NSP
Up until now the description of NB3 has been as general as possible. In this section
however, we describe how we have implemented NB3 to be applied to the NSP defined
in Section 6. We call this implementation Branesal (BRAnch and bound NEgotiating
Salesmen ALgorithm).
9.1 Calculating the Bounds
We will now explain how the bounds of the search tree are calculated in the case
of the NSP. To calculate these bounds the agent needs to know the shortest path
that goes through a given set of cities. It is however much too costly to calculate
this length exactly. Therefore, we consider an estimation of the shortest path by
calculating the greedy path instead.
Definition 26 The greedy path through a set of cities is calculated as the path
that goes from the home city v0 to its nearest neighbor v1, then from v1 to v1’s
nearest neighbor v2, etc. until we have visited all cities and come back to v0.
So for any world state  its cost for agent i, fi(), is estimated by agent α as the
length of the greedy path through the set of cities assigned to i in the world state .
This estimated value is denoted by f αi ().
This greedy heuristic may not be very accurate, but from experiments it turns
out to work quite well in practice. We have tried to use more accurate heuristics,
but the extra computations this involved were so costly that it was not worth using
them.
In the NSP an ‘action’ consists of one agent giving one city to another agent. Each
arc between two tree nodes is labeled by such an action, and the path from a node
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back to the root represents the partial plan consisting of all the actions that form
the labels along the path. One can check that the definitions below are consistent
with the general definitions of the bounds as given in section 7.3. The calculations
of the intermediate values and the lower bounds are also given in pseudo-code in
Algorithm 6.
Upper Bound
Although the specification of the NB3 algorithm defines an upper bound for every
node and every agent, the Branesal implementation does not calculate it. The reason
for this is that the expansion heuristic defined in Section 7.5 does not use it. Other
implementations of NB3 may however use another implementation of the expansion
heuristic.
Intermediate Value
In order to calculate the intermediate value of node n, we take the set of cities
currently assigned to i, remove all the cities that are given away by i in any of the
actions in path(n), and add all the cities that are acquired by i in any of the actions
in path(n). We then calculate the greedy path through this new set.
Lower Bound
The lower bound lbαi (n) is the minimum path length that i could possibly achieve in
any plan descending from node n. The most optimistic scenario is the case in which
i is able to give away all its interchangeable cities, except those that it has acquired
in path(n). The idea is that once a city v is acquired from some agent j in path(n)
it will not be given away again to some other agent k in any plan that descends
from n (in fact we even declared these kinds of plans unfeasible in Section 7). This is
because our agent would not consider such a plan because it would already consider
an equivalent plan, in which v is given directly from j to k, somewhere else in the
tree.
The lower bound of a node n for an agent i is therefore calculated as the length
of the greedy path through the home city, the fixed cities owned by i and the cities
given to i in any of the actions in path(n).
9.2 Splitting
Besides the bounding and the expansion heuristic, a very important design-issue for
any BB algorithm is the question of how to split the nodes. Since a plan is build up
from actions, it would be natural to split a node according to the several alternative
actions that can be performed. This would mean adding a new node for each action
that is compatible with path(n). However, in many cases this would result in a
huge amount of child nodes, making the algorithm very inefficient (if there are m
interchangeable cities per agent and a agents, then the total number of actions is
in the order of m · a2). Therefore we have chosen an implementation in which an
‘action’ is split up in smaller components.
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An action in the NSP consists of three components: an agent that gives away one
of its cities (the donor) the city that is being given away, and the agent that receives
the city (the acquirer). So instead of adding a child node for each possible action,
we first add a child for each possible donor, then pick the best of these children (i.e.
the child node with the highest expansion heuristic) and expand it by adding a child
for each of the cities that the donor can give away. Finally, we pick the best of these
nodes and add to it a set of children, each one of which corresponds to one of the
possible acquirers. So each arc between two nodes is not labeled by an action but
by a component of an action, and a path of three consecutive nodes corresponds to
one action. In this way, the maximum number of children that could be needed to
be generated in each cycle is reduced to only m + 2a (only a of these nodes however
correspond to a new plan).
Since the precise implementation is not relevant for the rest of the paper, we will
not give a more detailed description of this procedure and therefore continue as if
these three steps were taken in one step. That is: as if each arc between a parent and
a child node is labeled with an action, rather than only one component of an action.
9.3 Handling Proposals
When a proposal from another agent is received, α adds a new branch to the tree to
represent the proposed plan. The bounds and expansion heuristic are then calculated
for every new node in this branch, and all these new nodes are put into the open
list. In this way α can explore extensions or adaptations to the received proposal.
If a proposal is accepted by all participating agents, the corresponding plan is
immediately executed, which alters the state of the world (we have implemented
a system that sends a message to all agents whenever a plan is executed, to let
all agents know that the world state has changed). Therefore, α has to update its
internal representation of the world. Many of the branches in the search tree will
then become unfeasible, since they represent plans that are incompatible with the
new world state, so these branches are removed from the tree.
9.4 Data Structures
In order to describe the Branesal algorithm we first describe its most important
data structures: WorldState, Action, Message, Node and Tree. These data structures
will then be used in the next section to describe the implementation of Branesal in
pseudo code.
We assume there is a set of names of cities given, as well as a set of names of
agents:
City = {v0, v1, v2, ...}
Agent = {α, β, γ, ...}
The program contains one WorldState object, that represents the current assignment
of the cities of the NSP instance. There is a home city, a set of fixed cities and a set
of interchangeable cities. The assign function represents the assignment of the fixed
cities and interchangeable cities to the agents.





assign : fixedCities ∪ intCities → Agent
The components of the WorldState structure satisfy the following constraints:
∀ i ∈ Agent : |{v ∈ fixedCities | assign(v) = i}| = 1
fixedCities ∩ intCities = ∅
homeCity 6∈ fixedCities ∪ intCities
homeCity ∪ fixedCities ∪ intCities = City
The first of these constraints says that each agent has exactly one fixed city assigned
to it. The other three constraints together state that the set of fixed cities, the set
of interchangeable cities and the home city together form a partition of the set of all
cities.
An Action object represents the action of one agent giving one city to one other
agent.The agent that gives the city is called the ‘donor’ and the agent that receives





Agents send messages to each other to propose, accept or reject plans. Note that
in Section 5 we mentioned that the protocol does not formally include a ‘propose’
message because a proposal is simply the first ‘accept’ message in the conversation
regarding to a certain plan. It turns out however that the algorithm is easier to
implement if it internally does make a distinction between a proposal and an accep-
tance. Therefore, whenever the algorithm receives an accept message for a new plan,
the algorithm internally treats it as a ‘propose’ message, and whenever the algorithm
proposes a new plan, the communication layer of the agent converts it to an ‘accept’
message to comply with the protocol.
Message




The tree nodes of the search tree are implemented as the Node data structure. Each
node contains a reference to its parent node, and is labeled by an Action. The set of
all labels of all the ancestors of the node, including the node itself, is what we call
the path of the node and the set of all donors and acquirers of all the actions in the
path forms the set of participating agents (pa). Furthermore, each node contains an
intermediate value, a lower bound and an expansion heuristic for each agent. From
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these values one can calculate the normalized utility uαα and the opponent-utility uαpa.
Finally, the node contains the set of participating agents that still need to accept
the plan (as we will see later, it is initialized as the set of participating agents pa of






eα : Agent → R+
lbα : Agent → R+
h : R
u¯α : Agent → R
u¯αpa : R
haveNotAcceptedYet : 2Agent
Tree represents the search tree, which maintains a root node, an open list, and for
every agent a reservation value and a global lower bound.
Tree
root : Node
rvα : Agent → R+
glbα : Agent → R+
openList : 2Node
9.5 Procedures
We now describe the Branesal algorithm itself, which is given in Algorithm 1. We see
that after initialization, it consists of a while loop that repeatedly calls three func-
tions: expand, handleIncomingMessages and acceptOrPropose, which are described
below. The algorithm keeps looping until the deadline for the negotiations has passed.
The expand method starts by extracting the node with the highest expansion
heuristic from the open list and determining for which actions we should add child
nodes to it (we do not provide here the implementation of the function that deter-
mines what actions to split over, but works as explained in Section 9.2). For each
action to split over, we create a new node, label it with the given action, set its par-
ticipating agents, calculate its bounds (see Algorithm 6 for details on that), calculate
its expansion heuristic (in the way explained in Section 7.5), add the new node as
a child of the original node and add the new node to the open list. Finally, if the
new node is individually rational (i.e. for each participating agent the intermediate
value is lower than the reservation value) we can add it to the list of plans that are
candidates to be proposed. HandleIncomingMessages checks whether a message has
been received from any of the other agents. If not, the method returns. Otherwise, if
the incoming message is a proposal, then a new node n′ is created that corresponds
to the proposed plan and is added to the tree. The agent does not decide how to
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Algorithm 1 Branesal
Require: startTime, timePassed, expandInterval, lastAcceptOrProposeCall, tdead : R
Require:  : WorldState
Require: theTree : Tree
Require: foundByMe = ∅
Require: proposedToMe = ∅
Require: mαα : [0, tdead ]→ [0, 1]
Require: mαpa : [0, tdead ]→ [0, 1]
Require: offα : Agent → R+
1: initializeTree(, theTree)
2: startTime ← getCurrentTime()
3: timePassed ← 0
4: lastAcceptOrProposeCall ← 0
5:
6: while timePassed < tdead do
7: expand(, theTree, foundByMe)
8: handleIncomingMessages(theTree, offα)
9: if timePassed - lastAcceptOrProposeCall > expandInterval then
10: acceptOrPropose(foundByMe, proposedToMe, mαα , mαpa , timePassed)
11: lastAcceptOrProposeCall = timePassed
12: end if
13: timePassed ← getCurrentTime() - startTime
14: end while
Algorithm 2 initializeTree(, theTree)
Require: home, fixed, interchangeable, current, minimal : 2City
1: home ← {.homeCity}
2: for all i ∈ Agent do
3: fixed ← {v ∈ .fixedCities| .assign(v) = i}
4: interchangeable ← {v ∈ .intCities| .assign(v) = i}
5:
6: current ← home ∪ fixed ∪ interchangeable





12: theTree.rvαi ← root.eαi
13: theTree.glbαi ← root.lbαi
14:
15: theTree.root.u¯αi ← 0
16: end for
17: theTree.root.u¯αpa ← 0
18: theTree.openList ← {theTree.root}
reply to this proposal yet, because this is done later by the acceptOrPropose() func-
tion (Algorithm 5). If the incoming message is an acceptance of a plan, the agent
retrieves the plan from the tree. Note that this plan can indeed be found in the tree,
because the agent had stored the plan in the tree when the plan was first proposed.
In either case, the agent checks whether the proposing or accepting agent is
offering to pay a higher cost than it has offered before, and if that is indeed the case
the offer value of that agent is adapted. This means the expansion heuristic of each
node in the open list needs to be recalculated.
Finally, if the plan in the incoming message is accepted by all participating
agents, the execute method is called (Algorithm 7), which updates the world state
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Algorithm 3 expand(, theTree, foundByMe)
Require: n : Node
Require: splitActions : 2Action
1: //Get the node with the highest expansion heuristic and remove it from the open list:
2: n ← arg maxm{m.h | m ∈ openList}
3: theTree.openList ← theTree.openList \{n}
4:
5: //Get the set of actions to split over.
6: splitActions ← chooseSplitActions(n)
7:
8: //For each such action: create a new node, calculate its properties and add it to the tree.
9: for all action ∈ splitActions do
10: n′ ← new Node
11: n′.label ← action
12: n′.pa ← n.pa ∪ {action.acquirer}
13: n′.haveNotAcceptedYet ← n′.pa
14: calculateBounds(, n′, theTree)
15: n′.h ← calculateExpansionHeuristic(n′)
16: theTree.openList ← theTree.openList ∪{n′}
17: n′.parent ← n
18:
19: //If the node is individually rational, then add it to the list of proposals we might want
to propose.
20: if ∀ i ∈ n′.pa : rvαi > n′.eαi then
21: foundByMe ← foundByMe ∪{n′}
22: end if
23: end for
and resets the root of the tree. The acceptOrPropose method determines whether
α itself should accept or propose a plan, according to the procedure described in
Section 8.1. The calculateBounds function (Algorithm 6) calculates the intermediate
values and the lower bounds of each agent. Also, it uses the reservation values and
the global lower bounds to calculate the normalized utility of each agent. Finally it
calculates the opponent utility by taking the product of all the normalized utilities
of the other agents participating in the node’s plan.
9.6 Complexity
We will now discuss the amount of time and memory that is needed for each new
plan generated by the search algorithm.
9.6.1 Time Complexity
The most time consuming part of the algorithm is the calculation of the bounds
and the expansion heuristic each time a new node is added. The time complexity of
calculating the expansion heuristic is proportional to the number of agents O(a) (for
each participating agent we have to calculate the value of Pα(aci(e∗))).
Calculating the bounds of a node for one agent is quadratic in the number of
cities that that agent owns. This is because finding the greedy path involves finding
the nearest neighbor for each city owned by a certain agent. The bounds have to
be calculated for each agent, so if there are m interchangeable cities per agent,
calculating the bounds has a time-cost of O(am2). Generating a new node therefore
has a time complexity of O(a + am2).
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Algorithm 4 handleIncomingMessages(theTree, off α)
Require: msg : Message
Require: n′ : Node
Require: i : Agent
1: msg ← getMessageFromMessageQueue()
2: i ← msg.sender
3:
4: if msg.type = propose then
5: n′ ← insertProposedPlanIntoTree(theTree.root, msg.plan)
6: proposedToMe ← proposedToMe ∪{n′}
7:
8: //If the proposer offers to pay a higher price than he it offered before,
9: //update its offer value and re-calculate the expansion heuristic for every node in the
10: //tree.
11: if offαi < n′.eαi then
12: offαi ← n′.eαi
13: for all n ∈ theTree.openList do





19: if msg.type = accept then
20: n′ ← getNodeCorrespondingToPlan(msg.plan)
21:
22: //If the accepting agent accepts a price to pay higher than it has offered before,
23: //update its offer value and re-calculate the expansion heuristic for every node in the
24: //tree.
25: if offαi < n′.eαi then
26: offαi ← n′.eαi
27: for all n ∈ theTree.openList do




32: //The sender of the message has accepted the proposed plan,
33: //so we can remove it from the list of agents that have not accepted it yet.
34: //If all agents have accepted the plan, it can be executed.
35: n′.haveNotAcceptedYet ← n′.haveNotAcceptedYet \ {msg.sender}




Each time a node is split we need to generate m + 2a new children (as explained
in Section 9.2). Splitting a node therefore has a time cost in the order of (m + 2a) ·
(a + am2), that is: O(a2m2 + am3). Each time that such a split is made, there are
a plans generated, so we can say that the amount of time needed to explore one
possible plan is O(am2 + m3).
Another point regarding the time complexity that we would like to stress, is that
each time the agent receives a proposal (or the acceptance of an earlier made pro-
posal), the offer value of the agent that made the proposal (or accepted the proposal)
must be adapted, which means that for every node in the open list the expansion
heuristic needs to be recalculated. Moreover, the open list has to be reordered (it is
implemented as a priority queue so the node with highest expansion heuristic can
be retrieved fast).
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Algorithm 5 acceptOrPropose(foundByMe, proposedToMe, mαα , mαpa, timePassed)
Require: myAspiration, opponentAspiration : R
Require: bestFound : Node
Require: bestProposed : Node
1: myAspiration ← mαα(timePassed)
2: opponentAspiration ← mαpa(timePassed)
3:
4: bestFound ← getMostSelfish(foundByMe)
5:
6: //Get the most selfish node that is altruistic enough
7: repeat
8: bestProposed ← getMostSelfish(proposedToMe)
9: until bestProposed.u¯αpa > opponentAspiration or proposedToMe = ∅
10:
11: //If no node is altruistic enough, then get the most altruistic one instead
12: if bestProposed.u¯αpa ≤ opponentAspiration then
13: bestProposed ← getMostAltruistic(proposedToMe)
14: end if
15:
16: //If the best plan found by us (or proposed to us) is selfish enough, then propose it (or
accept it).
17: if bestFound.u¯αα >bestProposed.u¯αα then
18: if bestFound.u¯αα > myAspiration then
19: propose(bestFound)
20: foundByMe ← foundByMe \{bestFound}
21: end if
22: else
23: if bestProposed.u¯αα > myAspiration then
24: accept(bestProposed)
25: proposedToMe ← proposedToMe \{bestProposed}
26:
27: //If we are accepting a plan that all others already have accepted,
28: //then the plan will be executed.





In order to recalculate the expansion heuristic of a node, we only need to update
the value Pα(aci(e∗)) of the agent for which the offer value has changed. There-
fore, this can be done in constant time and thus the recalculation of the expansion
heuristics of all of the nodes is done in O(k) time (with k the size of the open list).
Reordering the open list can be done in O(k log(k)) time. Although k can be a
very large number, it turns out from experiments that the time spent on updating
the open list is in practice negligible. This is because the number of times that a
proposal or acceptance from another agent is received is very small compared to the
number of times that a node is expanded.
9.6.2 Space Complexity
Regarding the space complexity it is important to note that in each node we need
to store the bounds for each agent, so the memory needed for each node is O(a).
Therefore, each time we expand a node, the extra memory we need is (m + 2a) · a,
40 Dave de Jonge, Carles Sierra
Algorithm 6 calculateBounds(, n, theTree)
Require: home, fixed, interchangeable, acquired, donated, current, minimal : 2City
Require: path : 2Action
1: path ← getPath(n)
2: home ← {.homeCity}
3: for all i ∈ n.pa do
4: fixed ← {v ∈ .fixedCities| .assign(v) = i}
5: interchangeable ← {v ∈ .intCities| .assign(v) = i}
6: acquired ← {ac.city | ac ∈ path, ac.acquirer = i}
7: donated ← {ac.city | ac ∈ path, ac.donor = i}
8:
9: current ← home ∪ fixed ∪ acquired ∪ interchangeable \ donated










Algorithm 7 execute(n, theTree)
Require: path : 2Action
1: //Get the set of actions that form the path from the root to n
2: path ← getPath(n)
3:
4: //Update the world state by letting the actions in path act on it.
5: //That is: change the assignment of the cities to the agents
6: for all ac ∈ n.path do
7: .assign ∪{v 7→ ac.acquirer} \ {v 7→ ac.donor}
8: end for
9:
10: //Node n becomes the new root node
11: //and the rv and glb are set equal to the bounds of this new root.
12: theTree.root ← n
13: theTree.rvα ← n.eα
14: theTree.glbα ← n.lbα
that is: O(a2 + am). And, since expanding a node yields a new plans, the average
amount of memory needed for generating a single new plan is O(a + m).
10 Experiments and Results
We have conducted a number of experiments with Branesal and in this section we
present their results. Before we present these results however, we will first discuss in
Section 10.1 why we cannot compare our algorithm with existing algorithms, and in
Section 10.2 we describe how we have set up the experiments.
10.1 Comparing with other Algorithms
In order to test our algorithm, we would like to see how it performs against other
algorithms. That is: to have an NB3 agent engage in negotiations with agents running
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other negotiation algorithms, and see if our agent scores better than the others.
Unfortunately, we do not know of any existing algorithm that can be applied to our
domain. Existing algorithms only work for bilateral negotiations, require a mediator,
or assume that all possible offers and their utility values are known beforehand.
Testing NB3 against such algorithms would mean applying it to a domain it was not
developed for. Experimental results from such a domain would be meaningless.
The claim we make in this paper is that we are the first to successfully combine
search and negotiation in a scenario as complex as ours. We do not claim that our
implementation of BB is better than other kinds of search. It may very well be that
we could obtain better results if we would combine our negotiation strategy with,
for example, genetic algorithms, simulated annealing, taboo search, or other forms of
tree search. We do plan to test these alternatives, but we leave that as future work.
Furthermore, we would like to stress that it does not make sense to compare NB3
with a pure search algorithm, because one always needs to implement a negotiation
strategy that determines which solutions to propose, and when to accept which
proposals made by the other agents. Simply finding a good solution has no meaning
in the context of automated negotiations, since it needs to be accepted by the parti-
cipating agents as well. The final outcome of a negotiation therefore depends highly
on the negotiation strategies applied by the agents.
What we can test however, is how the algorithm scales with increasing complexity
of the problem instances. For that purpose we conducted a number of experiments in
which all agents were running NB3, and compared the results for different numbers
of agents, different numbers of cities, and different deadlines. Also, we have tested
how the algorithm performs when negotiating against a simplified version of itself
that applies random search. Furthermore, we have compared the solutions found by
the algorithm with a certain notion of optimality.
10.2 Experimental Setup
For our experiments we have made use of two types of NSP instances that differ in
the way they are generated: random instances and simple instances. For the random
instances all cities are represented as points in the two-dimensional plane, with the
home city located at the coordinates (0, 0). The x and y coordinates of all other
cities are integers randomly chosen from a uniform distribution over the interval
[−100, 100]. After generating the coordinates of the cities, the cities are randomly
divided among the agents, such that every agent owns the same amount of cities.
Also, for each agent, one of its cities is randomly chosen to be its fixed city. All other
cities (except the home city) are interchangeable. The distance between two cities
is given by the Euclidean distance. In all experiments except those in Section 10.7
we have used the random instances. The generation of simple instances is explained
there.
For each run of the experiments we store for each agent the coordinates of the
cities it initially owns and the coordinates of the cities it owns after the negotiations.
When the run has finished we find the shortest path through each of these sets of
cities, by feeding them into the Concorde TSP Solver [4].
We denote the length of the shortest path through the initial set of cities owned
by agent i as C ini , and we denote the length of the shortest path through the final set
of cities owned by agent i as Cfini . With this notation we then define our performance
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C ini − Cfini
C ini
(11)
This is the result of one run. The results presented in this section are all averaged
over 100 runs, each with the same parameters, but with a different instance of the
NSP. We should stress however, that the agents do not try to optimize this value,
but rather each agent tries to minimize its individual path length. Therefore, we are
not so much interested in the value of Q, but rather in how it changes as the problem
instances get more complex.
Note that in the literature on bilateral negotiations one often uses the product
of the agents’ utility gains (the Nash Product [31]) rather than the sum to define
a measure of performance. The problem with this is that when we are dealing with
multilateral negotiations, the set of agents participating in a deal is often a subset of
all the agents involved in the negotiations. Therefore it can happen that one agent
does not decrease its cost at all, while all other agents do manage to obtain low
costs. If we would then take the product of all utility gains, the result would be zero,
because of the single agent that did not succeed in its negotiations.
For each data point we have also calculated the standard error, as σn√n with
n = 100, where σn is the standard deviation of Q over n runs. We will not give
the standard error of every data point in this paper, but, in order to indicate the
accuracy of the experiments, we will mention for each experiment the highest and
lowest standard errors among the data points. All experiments were conducted on
an iMac with 3.4 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 8 GB of memory. The agents were
implemented in Java on top of the Jade [20] platform.
10.3 Varying Negotiation Length
In order to determine how the results improve with longer negotiations, we have
done a number of tests, each with the negotiation length set to a different value.
Each of these tests involved 10 agents, all running the Branesal algorithm, with 10
interchangeable cities per agent.
Because in some of the following experiments we vary the number of agents,
we always measure the length of negotiations in milliseconds per agent. So if the
negotiation length is 500 ms per agent and there are 10 agents, the deadline of the
negotiations is set to 5 seconds. We should remark however that, since all agents are
running on the same machine, we had no control over the amount of CPU cycles
assigned to each agent, since this is the responsibility of the Java Virtual Machine
and the operating system. Therefore, we can only be sure that the amount of time
that an agent has to run the algorithm is 500 ms on average.
The results are presented in Figure 3. We see that the costs of the agents decrease
significantly and that the results get better as the available time increases. After all,
the more time the agents have, the more good plans they will find, and therefore
the better the final agreements they will make. The highest value (48%) is reached
with 550 ms per agent. It seems this value does not improve with more time. The
standard errors of these data points lie between 0.38 and 0.69.
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Fig. 3 Cost reduction as a function of time.
10.4 Varying the Number of Agents
To determine how the algorithm scales with the number of agents, we have performed
a number of tests with each a different number of agents, all running the Branesal
algorithm. In each test 10 interchangeable cities were assigned to each agent and the
negotiation length was set to 250 ms per agent. According to the results presented
in the previous section, 250 ms is not enough for the agents to reach their maximum
score. We have chosen this value however in order to put the agents under pressure,
increasing the contrast between the various tests. The results are presented in the
Fig. 4 Cost reduction as a function of the number of agents and of the number of cities.
left graph of Figure 4. Interestingly, it seems from this graph that at first, the results
get better as the number of agents increases, even though the problem becomes more
complex. Apparently, the increased computing power resulting from the larger num-
ber of agents and the fact that agents can profit from the plans discovered by other
agents outweighs the increased complexity of the problem. Unfortunately this only
remains true as long as the number of agents is less than or equal to 16. With more
than 16 agents we see that the complexity of the problem becomes more important
and the results start to decrease. It is still unclear to us why this turning point takes
place at 16 agents. The standard errors of these data points lie between 0.35 and
0.98.
10.5 Varying the Number of Cities per Agent
We now look at what happens if we make the agreement space larger (more inter-
changeable cities per agent), while keeping the number of agents constant. In each
test there were 10 agents, all running the Branesal algortithm, with a negotiation
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length of 250 ms per agent. The results are presented in the right graph of Figure 4.
As expected, with an increasing number of cities, the results decrease, but we think
this decrease is relatively small, as the number of cities more than triples, while the
value of Q only drops from 43 to 27. This can be explained by the fact that the ex-
pansion heuristic successfully manages to steer the search such that only interesting
plans are explored and the unprofitable plans are skipped. In this way the increased
size of the problem hardly decreases the efficiency of the algorithm. Therefore, we
can conclude from this that the expansion heuristic successfully manages to limit the
number of redundant nodes that are explored, as it is supposed to do. The standard
errors of these data points lie between 0.41 and 1.07.
10.6 Comparing with Random Search
In the previous sections all agents have been running the Branesal algorithm. How-
ever, the most important question is how it performs when negotiating with agents
that run different algorithms. Since there exists however no comparable negotiation
algorithm, we have tested it instead against a copy of itself that applies random
search.
We let some agents running Branesal (the “smart agents”) negotiate with a num-
ber of agents running a random search (the “dumb agents”). With “random search”
we mean that the agent is running an algorithm that is identical to Branesal, except
that the expansion heuristic for each node is replaced with a random number.
We did four tests. Each test involved 10 agents, but for each test the number
of dumb agents among those 10 was different. The negotiation length was set to
250 ms per agent. The results are presented in Figure 5. For each test we show the
average score of the dumb agents (the left graph), the average score of the smart
agents (center), and the score averaged over all agents together (right). When we
Fig. 5 Cost reduction of dumb agents (left), smart agents (center), and all agents (right), as
a function of the number of dumb agents.
compare the left graph with the middle graph, we can clearly see that, as expected,
the smart agents score significantly better than the dumb agents. In other words: the
expansion heuristic is effective. It is also interesting to see that if there are only a
few dumb agents the dumb agents still manage to decrease their cost considerably.
This can be explained by the fact that, although the plans they discover are bad,
they still get offered good proposals from the smart agents. Since the plans found by
the smart agents are generally better than the ones found by the dumb agents, the
smart agents have more bargaining power, and are thus able to exploit the dumb
agents. The standard errors of the results of the dumb agents lie between 0.54 and
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1.05, the standard errors of the results of the smart agents lie between 0.47 and 1.30,
and the standard errors of the overall results lie between 0.43 and 0.59.
10.7 Comparing with the Optimal Solution
In this section we compare the results of our algorithm with the optimal solution.
Note however, that the notion of ‘optimal solution’ can be difficult to define in
automated negotiations. A common way of defining optimality in games is to use
some equilibrium concept such as the Nash Equilibrium [32]. The problem however
is that a game often needs very specific properties in order to be able to calculate
such an equilibrium (e.g. the presence of a discount factor in bargaining games).
Moreover, even if one is able to play a strategy to reach the equilibrium solution,
this would only be optimal under the assumption that the opponent also plays that
strategy. A negotiator that manages to exploit suboptimal play of its opponents
would be even better. Another definition of ‘optimal solution’ would be the outcome
in which your agent achieves the minimum possible cost. However, this definition is
unpractical since it is highly unlikely that the opponents of the agent would accept
such a solution. For example, when two agents negotiate on how to divide a pie
between them, the optimal outcome for agent α would be that α gets all of the pie
and β gets nothing. Of course, β would never agree with such a deal, so this definition
of optimality is unrealistic. A third way of defining the optimal solution would be to
define it as the solution that minimizes the social cost, that is: sum of the costs of all
agents. The problem with this however is that the agents are simply not interested
in reaching the social optimum. Every agent would prefer to try to obtain another,
more selfish, solution.
So generally speaking, there is no such thing as an ‘optimal solution’ in automated
negotiations. This is a fact that actually occurs in many games. Take for example
robot-soccer. When one develops a robot-soccer team one can only compare it to
other teams and see which one is best, but there is no way to compare the team with
any kind of theoretically optimal soccer team.
Nevertheless, we have come up with a solution that allows us to define a kind of
optimal solution in special cases. We have created a set of special instances of the
NSP that have the nice property that there exists one specific solution that is clearly
the most reasonable one, because any other solution for which one agent decreases
its costs would imply a strong increase in the cost of another agent and would
therefore be unrealistic. The idea is that the cities are distributed in clusters around
the fixed cities of the agents. The optimal solution is reached whenever each agent
has exactly those cities in the cluster around its fixed city. We call these instances
simple instances.
The cities of these simple instances are again given as 2-dimensional coordinates
and their distances are the Euclidean distances. The graphs are however generated
in two stages: in the first stage we create a random cities (with a the number of
agents: a = |A|), far away from each other. Each of these cities is assigned to one
of the agents as its fixed city (each agent gets exactly one fixed city). For each such
fixed city we then randomly generate m cities nearby that city. In this way we have
created a clusters of m + 1 cities each. So after this first stage all the cities of one
cluster are assigned to the same agent. We refer to this assignment as the ‘optimal
assignment’. This assignment is optimal in the sense that every agent owns a set of
46 Dave de Jonge, Carles Sierra
cities that lie very close to each other so the agents cannot decrease their path length
any further by negotiation.
Then, in the second stage, for each agent we ‘swap’ some of its cities with cities
from other clusters. A swap means that we randomly pick one city assigned to the
agent, and one city assigned to an other agent and interchange them. For each agent
we makem/3 swaps, so after swapping each agent owns at least one city from another
cluster, and on average for each agent two thirds of its interchangeable cities are in
another cluster (we make m/3 swaps for each agent, and each swap involves 2 cities,
so in total 2/3 ·m · a cities change owner). We refer to this new assignment as the
‘initial assignment’, because this is the assignment of the cities at the start of the
negotiations.
The length of the shortest path through the set of cities that are assigned to







C ini − Cfini
C ini − C∗i
(12)
We have only used NSP instances for which C ini − C∗i ≥ 10 for each agent. With
these instances we have repeated the experiments of Section 10.3 with four different
values of m, namely: 6, 9, 12, and 15. We see that the algorithm is able to reach
Fig. 6 Increasing negotiation length, with simple NSP instances. Top left: 6 interchangeable
cities per agent, top right: 9 interchangeable cities per agent, bottom left: 12 interchangeable
cities per agent, bottom right: 15 interchangeable cities per agent
a score of 80% of the optimal solution. Furthermore, we note that as the number
of cities increases, the algorithm converges more slowly, but still manages to reach
80%. The standard errors of the data points in these four graphs lie between 0.72
and 1.70.
We expect that non-selfish negotiating agents could reach a higher score than
this. Also, a (distributed) constraint optimization algorithm would probably be more
successful in decreasing the social cost. However, it is important to note that NB3 is
NB3: a Multilateral Negotiation Algorithm 47
designed to optimize individual costs, rather than social cost, so one cannot compare
this result with results from non-selfish scenarios (one could make NB3 a non-selfish
algorithm by defining the individual cost functions to be equal to the social cost,
but it would then still be less efficient then other non-selfish algorithms, because the
agents could be searching through overlapping regions of the agreement space).
Also one should note that the fact that a score of 100% is not reached, does not
mean that the optimal solution has not been found by any of the agents. Even if an
agent finds the solution that minimizes social cost it may still try to propose other,
more selfish, solutions. It might for example happen that agents α and β come to a
deal that yields low cost to both agents, but that is incompatible with the socially
optimal solution, especially if the resulting individual costs for α and β are lower
than what they would get in the socially optimal solution. And even if a deal is
individually worse than the social optimum, agents still might prefer to come to a
quick individually suboptimal solution rather than wait and hope they can find a
better solution, since the available time for search is limited and agents fear missing
good deals because of competition.
One alternative way of solving the NSP might be to use clustering rather than
heuristic search to find good solutions. We have intentionally not tried to do this,
because clustering would only be applicable to NSP and not to general negotiation
problems. Our goal was not to find the best solution to the NSP, but to use NSP as
a testbed for general negotiation algorithms.
Yet another way of solving the NSP would be to apply a centralized approach in
which a mediator finds a solution that benefits all agents and is the most fair solution
according to some fairness criterion. However, once again, this is not the goal of our
work. In real-world situations it is not always possible to find an impartial mediator,
to have all agents to agree on the definition of fairness, or to make agents cooperate
in finding social solutions.
11 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have introduced a new family of negotiation algorithms for very
large and complex agreement spaces, with multiple selfish agents, non-linear utility
functions and a limited amount of time. This family is called NB3 and applies best-
first Branch and Bound to search for good proposals.
Our main motivation for doing so is to bring automated negotiations closer to
real-world negotiations. Therefore, we have had to discard a number of assumptions
that are usually made in existing literature, as we consider them unrealistic.
One of those assumptions is the application of the Alternating Offers protocol.
In order to discard the alternating offers protocol we have introduced a new protocol
for multilateral negotiations that assumes as few restrictions as possible. We call this
the Unstructured Communication Protocol.
Moreover, we have introduced a new test bed for multilateral, non-linear negotia-
tions called the Negotiating Salesmen Problem. We introduced this problem because
in most existing work the effort necessary to determine the value of a deal is ignored.
It is often assumed that given a deal, its corresponding utility can be calculated
quickly, which we consider unrealistic. In the NSP on the other hand, the calculation
of the utility (or cost) of a given deal is computationally expensive.
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We have defined a general purpose heuristic to guide the Branch & Bound search
of the NB3 algorithm. Furthermore we have defined a new negotiation strategy that
does not use a single aspiration level for the utility, as in most existing work, but that
uses two aspiration levels because it considers the utility aspired by our agent and
the utility to be conceded to the opponents as two separate quantities. This allows
our agent to not only determine what to propose, but also to determine whether it
should make a proposal or rather continue searching for better proposals.
We have implemented an instance of NB3 for the NSP that we call Branesal and
we have performed several experiments with it, with extremely large search spaces
(of the order 10100). From these experiments we draw the following conclusions:
– Our agent indeed manages to decrease its costs significantly by negotiation.
– Most of this decrease is obtained within half a second.
– If we increase the complexity of the problem by increasing the number of agents,
the results remain stable, up to 18 agents.
– If we increase the complexity of the problem by increasing the number of cities,
the results only get slightly worse.
– The heuristic search applied by our algorithm successfully manages to prune
redundant nodes.
– The heuristic search applied by our algorithm is significantly better than random
search.
– For problem instances that have a clear optimal solution, the algorithm manages
to reach a solution which is at 80% of the optimal solution.
For the future, we are planning to fine-tune some of the components of NB3 such
as the expansion heuristic and the negotiation strategy. We plan to experiment with
different values of the concession degrees, for example, and with different initial and
final values of the aspiration levels, which currently only take the values 0 and 1.
Moreover, as explained in Section 8, in the current implementation the agent treats
the set of opponents as if it were one opponent to which it should concede. We will
improve the negotiation strategy by dropping this assumption, so that our agent
can treat every single other agent as a different opponent. Furthermore, we have
mentioned in Section 8.1.1 that there is a parameter that determines how long the
agent continues expanding the search tree before deciding whether to make a new
proposal or not (the expandInterval parameter in Algorithm 1). We will investigate
the influence of the value of this parameter on the results.
In the NSP, the preferences of the agents are expressed explicitly as utility val-
ues. We think that for practical applications it is unrealistic to assume that user
preferences can be expressed explicitly as numerical utility functions. Therefore, we
will adapt the algorithm so that it can handle qualitative preference relations in-
stead. Furthermore, the current implementation assumes there is a straightforward
way to estimate the opponents’ utility functions. To make this more difficult we plan
to develop an implementation of NB3 for the Diplomacy game, which has complex
rules that make it much more difficult to determine the utility of a deal. Moreover,
Diplomacy has an extremely large search space.
Finally, we should implement other negotiation algorithms by combining our ne-
gotiation strategy with different kinds of search, such as genetic algorithms, simulated
annealing, and taboo search.
NB3: a Multilateral Negotiation Algorithm 49
12 Acknowledgments
Supported by the Agreement Technologies CONSOLIDER project, contract CSD2007-
0022 and INGENIO 2010 and CHIST-ERA project ACE and the Spanish Ministry
of Education and Science TIN2010-16306 project CBIT and EU project 318770
PRAISE and Project PACES; EPSRC EP/J012149/1.
References
1. An, B., Gatti, N., Lesser, V.: Extending alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and
many-to-many settings. In: Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint
Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02, WI-IAT
’09, pp. 423–426. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA (2009). DOI 10.1109/
WI-IAT.2009.188. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WI-IAT.2009.188
2. An, B., Gatti, N., Lesser, V.: Bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertain reserve
prices. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 26(3), 420–455 (2013). DOI
10.1007/s10458-012-9198-5. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-012-9198-5
3. An, B., Sim, K.M., Tang, L., Li, S., Cheng, D.: Continuous time negotiation mechanism
for software agents. IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
36(6), 1261–1272 (2006)
4. Applegate, D., Bixby, R.E., Chvátal, V., Cook, W.J.: http://www.tsp.gatech.edu/concorde
(2012)
5. Arcos, J.L., Esteva, M., Noriega, P., Rodríguez-Aguilar, J.A., Sierra, C.: Engineering open
environments with electronic institutions. Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelli-
gence 18(2), 191–204 (2005)
6. Baarslag, T., Hindriks, K., Jonker, C.M., Kraus, S., Lin, R.: The first automated nego-
tiating agents competition (ANAC 2010). In: T. Ito, M. Zhang, V. Robu, S. Fatima,
T. Matsuo (eds.) New Trends in Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiations, Series of
Studies in Computational Intelligence. Springer-Verlag (2010)
7. Bektas, T.: The multiple traveling salesman problem: an overview of formulations and
solution procedures. Omega 34(3), 209–219 (2006)
8. DAIDE: Diplomacy ai development environment, http://www.daide.org.uk (2013)
9. Endriss, U.: Monotonic concession protocols for multilateral negotiation. In: Proceedings
of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems,
AAMAS ’06, pp. 392–399. ACM, New York, NY, USA (2006). DOI 10.1145/1160633.
1160702. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1160633.1160702
10. Fabregues, A., Sierra, C.: An agent architecture for simultaneous bilateral negotiations.
In: Proceedings of the 13è Congrés Internacional de l’Associació Catalana d’Intel·ligència
Artificial (CCIA 2010), pp. 29–38. Espluga de Francolí, Tarragona (2010)
11. Fabregues, A., Sierra, C.: Dipgame: a challenging negotiation testbed. Engineering Appli-
cations of Artificial Intelligence (2011)
12. Faratin, P., Sierra, C., Jennings, N.R.: Negotiation decision functions for autonomous
agents. Robotics and Autonomous Systems 24(3-4), 159 – 182 (1998). DOI 10.
1016/S0921-8890(98)00029-3. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0921889098000293. Multi-Agent Rationality
13. Faratin, P., Sierra, C., Jennings, N.R.: Using similarity criteria to make negotiation trade-
offs. pp. 119–126 (2000)
14. Fatima, S., Wooldridge, M., Jennings, N.R.: An analysis of feasible solutions for multi-issue
negotiation involving nonlinear utility functions. In: Proceedings of The 8th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2, AAMAS ’09, pp.
1041–1048. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
Richland, SC (2009). URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1558109.1558158
15. Gatti, N., Giunta, F.D., Marino, S.: Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncer-
tain deadlines: an efficient algorithm. Artificial Intelligence 172(8-9), 1119 – 1157 (2008).
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2007.11.007. URL http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0004370207001981
16. Gendron, B., Crainic, T.G.: Parallel branch-and-bound algorithms: Survey and synthesis.
Operations Research (42), 1042–1066 (1994)
50 Dave de Jonge, Carles Sierra
17. Hemaissia, M., El Fallah Seghrouchni, A., Labreuche, C., Mattioli, J.: A multilateral multi-
issue negotiation protocol. In: Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on
Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, AAMAS ’07, pp. 155:1–155:8. ACM, New
York, NY, USA (2007). DOI 10.1145/1329125.1329314. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/1329125.1329314
18. Hindriks, K., Tykhonov, D.: Opponent modelling in automated multi-issue negotiation
using bayesian learning. In: Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Au-
tonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 1, AAMAS ’08, pp. 331–338. Interna-
tional Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC (2008).
URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1402383.1402433
19. Ito, T., Klein, M., Hattori, H.: A multi-issue negotiation protocol among agents with
nonlinear utility functions. Multiagent Grid Syst. 4, 67–83 (2008). URL http://dl.acm.
org/citation.cfm?id=1378675.1378678
20. Jade: Java agent development framework, http://jade.tilab.com (2012)
21. Klein, M., Faratin, P., Sayama, H., Bar-Yam, Y.: Protocols for negotiating complex con-
tracts. Intelligent Systems, IEEE 18(6), 32 – 38 (2003). DOI 10.1109/MIS.2003.1249167
22. Koenig, S., Tovey, C., Lagoudakis, M., Markakis, V., Kempe, D., Keskinocak, P., Kley-
wegt, A., Meyerson, A., Jain, S.: The power of sequential single-item auctions for agent
coordination. In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
pp. 1625–1629 (2006)
23. Krishna, V., Serrano, R.: Multilateral bargaining. Review of Economic Studies 63(1), 61–
80 (1996). URL http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:restud:v:63:y:1996:i:1:p:
61-80
24. Lai, G., Sycara, K., Li, C.: A decentralized model for automated multi-attribute negotia-
tions with incomplete information and general utility functions. Multiagent Grid Syst. 4,
45–65 (2008). URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1378675.1378677
25. Lawler, E.L., Wood, D.E.: Branch-and-bound methods: A survey. Operations Research
14(4), 699–719 (1966)
26. Lin, R., Kraus, S.: Can automated agents proficiently negotiate with humans? Commun.
ACM 53, 78–88 (2010). DOI http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1629175.1629199. URL http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/1629175.1629199
27. Marsa-Maestre, I., Lopez-Carmona, M.A., Velasco, J.R., de la Hoz, E.: Effective bidding
and deal identification for negotiations in highly nonlinear scenarios. In: Proceedings
of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems -
Volume 2, AAMAS ’09, pp. 1057–1064. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC (2009). URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=1558109.1558160
28. Marsa-Maestre, I., Lopez-Carmona, M.A., Velasco, J.R., Ito, T., Klein, M., Fujita, K.:
Balancing utility and deal probability for auction-based negotiations in highly nonlinear
utility spaces. In: Proceedings of the 21st International Jont Conference on Artifical
Intelligence, IJCAI’09, pp. 214–219. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco,
CA, USA (2009). URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1661445.1661480
29. MJC2: http://www.mjc2.com/transport logistics management.htm (2011)
30. Modi, P.J., Shen, W.M., Tambe, M., Yokoo, M.: Adopt: Asynchronous distributed con-
straint optimization with quality guarantees. Artif. Intell. 161(1-2), 149–180 (2005). DOI
10.1016/j.artint.2004.09.003. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2004.09.003
31. Nash, J.: The bargaining problem. "Econometrica" "18", 155–162 (1950)
32. Nash, J.: Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics 54(2), pp. 286–295 (1951). URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1969529
33. Nguyen, T.D., Jennings, N.R.: Coordinating multiple concurrent negotiations. In: Proceed-
ings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems - Volume 3, AAMAS ’04, pp. 1064–1071. IEEE Computer Society, Washington,
DC, USA (2004). DOI 10.1109/AAMAS.2004.94. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/
AAMAS.2004.94
34. Norman, D.: http://www.ellought.demon.co.uk/dipai (2012)
35. Ortner, J.M.: A continuous time model of bilateral bargaining (2012). URL http://
people.bu.edu/jortner/index_files/CTBargaining.pdf
36. Osborne, M., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press (1994)
37. Papadimitriou, C.H.: Computational Complexity. Addison-Wesley (1994)
38. Poundstone, W.: Prisoner’s Dilemma, 1st edn. Doubleday, New York, NY, USA (1993)
NB3: a Multilateral Negotiation Algorithm 51
39. Robu, V., Somefun, D.J.A., Poutré, J.A.L.: Modeling complex multi-issue negotiations
using utility graphs. In: Proceedings of AAMAS’05, pp. 280–287 (2005)
40. Rosenschein, J.S., Zlotkin, G.: Rules of Encounter. The MIT Press, Cambridge, USA
(1994)
41. Rubinstein, A.: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50(1), 97–109
(1982). URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v50y1982i1p97-109.html
42. Serrano, R.: bargaining. In: S.N. Durlauf, L.E. Blume (eds.) The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (2008)
43. Sierra, C., Debenham, J.: The logic negotiation model. In: Sixth International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS ’07, pp. 1026–1033.
ACM (2007)
44. Stahl, I.: Bargaining theory. Stockholm : EFI (1972)
45. Vieira Moura, A., Augusto Scaraficci, R.: A grasp strategy for a more constrained school
timetabling problem. International Journal of Operational Research 7(2/2010), 152 – 170
(2010)
46. Willemen, R.: School timetable construction : algorithms and complexity. T.U. Eindhoven
(2002). URL http://library.tue.nl/csp/dare/LinkToRepository.csp?recordnumber=
553569
47. Williams, C.R., Robu, V., Gerding, E.H., Jennings, N.R.: Using gaussian processes to op-
timise concession in complex negotiations against unknown opponents. In: Proceedings of
the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Vol-
ume One, IJCAI’11, pp. 432–438. AAAI Press (2011). DOI 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/
IJCAI11-080. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-080
48. Yokoo, M., Durfee, E.H., Ishida, T., Kuwabara, K.: The distributed constraint satisfac-
tion problem: Formalization and algorithms. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering 10, 673–685 (1998)
